

E 407

.B53

Copy 1



Class E407

Book B53



1

469

A REVIEW

OF

THE MEXICAN WAR

ON

CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES:

AND

AN ESSAY

ON

THE MEANS OF PREVENTING WAR.

BY THE REV. PHILIP BERRY, A. B.
Of Magdalene College, Cambridge, a ^UPresbyter of the Diocese of Maryland.

[REPRINTED FROM THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.]

COLUMBIA, S. C.
PRINTED BY A. S. JOHNSTON.

1849.

THE AUTHOR is prevented from superintending, personally, the publication of this work (which, however, he leaves in the best hands,) by his absence in Europe, which will be prolonged for some years. And this allusion suggests the mention of the circumstance, that the Executive Committee of the Peace Society has appointed him a Delegate to the Peace Congress which will meet in Paris, next August, a circumstance which indicates the kind interest felt by its members towards this literary effort, (such as it is,) in the cause of peace and good will towards men.

ADVERTISEMENT.

Although the author of these pages does not owe to his brethren in the ministry, an explanation of his position, as a contributor to a Review which is not conducted by members of his own church, yet, if there be any who are interested in it, he has only to remind them that there is but one Episcopal periodical published in the South, of which the editor is a Southerner, or which can be properly regarded as a Southern publication. He alludes to that published in Charleston, the aim of which (to the best of his knowledge) is scarcely other than diocesan.

It must be acknowledged that the brevity of this essay hardly consists with the importance of the theme, or with the abundance and interesting variety of the materials that gather around it. But the limited space which, on the present occasion, has been assigned, and which is rather imposed by the form of republication that has been adopted,* has rendered it expedient to abridge the article to less than half of its original length.

It is, perhaps, as well to apprise the reader, that the work, in its previous form, appeared under the signature of "A Southern Democrat," in the competition for a prize offered by the Peace Society, and that the writer is the individual referred to, in the following remarks, in the Peace Advocate. After announcing Mr. Livermore as the successful competitor, and the circumstances under which the essay of Judge Jay was about to be published, the editor added:—"Another of the twelve competitors for the prize, requested the return of his manuscript, with a view to publication, and it was accordingly sent back to him; but we do not learn that he has yet taken steps to have it published. We should be glad, having seen them in manuscript, to see his and several others in print, as we

* Besides being intended for gratuitous distribution, principally among the friends of the author, the mail was anticipated as the channel of transportation to those abroad, as well as in this country.

think they would be useful, and do credit to their respective authors."

The chapter on the prevention of war, was added in consequence of a suggestion in the prize advertisement of the Peace Society, that the essayists should also treat of "what means may and should be adopted by nations, to prevent similar evils in future." In the present form of the article, it may seem that more than a due space has been allotted to this subject, in a work purporting to treat of a particular war. In the original form of it, however, a far less proportion was thus occupied.

CONTENTS.

The Origin of the War.

1. Preliminary remarks.
2. The war question, as stated by the Government of the United States, and as stated by that of Mexico—by both as having reference to Texas.
3. American claims on Mexico.
4. Efforts of the Government of the United States to conciliate Mexico—Mission of Mr. Slidell—Objection to the course adopted by this Government, when the special mission failed in the first instance.
5. Question of the boundary line.—As between Texas and Coahuila.—As between Texas and Mexico.—Remarks on Santa Anna's treaty with Texas.—Dismissal of the question unsettled.
6. The position of the United States, as to the boundary question, a peculiar one—but not immediately affected much by the refusal of Mexico to treat with them.—Consequent objection to the army of the former advancing to the Rio Grande—Formal commencement of the war by Mexico, but virtual commencement by both simultaneously.—It ought to have been averted by the United States.

Observations on certain principles of policy influencing the Government and much of the public spirit in the United States, previously to the war.

1. The former moderate course of the Government, which ought not to have been abated.
2. The motive of disabusing the mind of the enemy as to the untrammelled powers of the Executive.
3. Exception taken by this Government to the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico.
4. The expediency of impressing other nations with the power of this country.—Allusion to the Oregon treaty.—General Cass and

the Quintuple treaty.—Conclusion as to this impulse to a belligerent spirit.

The moral aspect of circumstances in the progress and conduct of the war.

1. Objection to our army *crossing* the Rio Grande.—Further conciliatory propositions to Mexico not consistent with the occupation of her soil, or recommended by the apparent force.—Allusion to the condition of General Taylor's forces at the time of the earliest collision.—Inference from the same, as to any past anticipation of the expediency of following up advantages offensively.
2. The manner of bringing the war to a termination.—The suggested assumption of a boundary to the extent of our possessions held by force, without a treaty with Mexico.—The suspension of hostile movements on arrival at the city of Mexico.—The treaty by which the war was terminated.
3. On Letters of Marque.
4. The decision of the American Government respecting the armistice at Monterey.
5. The conduct of the American commanders-in-chief, during the war, creditable to their bearing.—The American force.
6. The Mexican generals.—The women of Mexico.—The Mexican forces.

Miscellaneous Remarks.

1. The triumphs of military skill not among the subjects contemplated by this review.—Brief allusion to military qualities of Taylor and Scott.—A Mexican accomplishment.—The discussion of military questions, without professional knowledge, and almost universal folly, its evil effect.
2. Brief notice of the evils of war.
3. *Principles*.—Questions as to the uses of war for the advancement of civilization.—Victor Cousin—On just wars.—Schiller cited.—The little prospect of national repentance for injustice or inhumanity, a sufficient argument against all war.—The incongruity of the adopted solution of the Mexican question, with the social character of American citizens, which the conduct of their government should exhibit.—Illustration of proper national conduct, assuming the case to be not an extreme one.—The question turns upon the supposition of an extreme one.

4. The *world-historical* importance of the recent war.

ON THE PREVENTION OF WARS.

Enumeration of various means of preventing the occurrence of war, of which only a few are here treated of.

1. Peace Societies.—Efficiency of that in America.—Imaginary intervention of peaceable citizens between two hostile armies.—A peace convention should have been proposed to Mexican citizens.—The prevention of civil war should be among the objects of such societies.
2. A Congress of nations.
3. Unfettered commerce.—Bastiat on the protective policy.—Lord Palmerston on the same.—National credit.—International intercourse.
4. On some of the means by which *civil* war may be prevented.—Privileged orders.—France and her troubles.—Note on the Federalist, and Lamartine.—The Sabbath.—England.—The English aristocracy.—A lessened obstruction to the masses of society from a use of the earth, a great security against both foreign and civil war.—A scrupulous observance of Federal terms and State-rights in a Federal commonwealth, essential to its preservation.—The most politic kind of resistance to oppression.

An appeal to the nations.

The United States.—England.—Note, on the military sentiment of the English.—France.—Allusion to the United States and their foreign population, especially the Irish.—National duty of the United States, in prospect of their position relating to England.—The uses of the prevalent exceptions to good feeling between these two powers.—The Press.—Remark of Sir Robert Peel.—The British possessions in the west.—Probable consequences of another war, to the United States and to the world.—A word to Mexico.—The honor that awaits the nation which hastens to set the example of renouncing war.—The author's hope that a republic will have this credit.

Supplemental notes.

- A. On the modern use of the term *chivalry*.—The principle of *self-sacrifice*.—Michelet.
- B. The position of the American people with reference to what is called *repudiation*.
- C. On copyright.

THE
MEXICAN WAR REVIEWED
ON
CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES.

When the views of a theologian by profession are presented on a question such as that to which these pages relate, the doubt may well be suggested whether they ought, at any time, to treat questions of human strife, detached from their relation to the life-principle of peace, and apart from their place (one of opposition) in the map of its bearings on human destiny. Certainly, it is only by the light of that principle that we are enabled to exhibit the actual magnitude of such subjects, and to assign their due importance, relatively to the comprehensive interests of the world. Both the scriptural and the political argument against war in general, appear to have been so fully presented by other writers, that little scope has been left unoccupied in either department. The present writer will however attempt the application of such new principles as may occur to him in the course of this review.

In approaching the questions that grow out of the late war with Mexico, the following general heads are proposed to be treated of:—

I. The origin of the war.

II. The moral aspect of circumstances in the progress and conduct of it.

I. *The Origin of the war* is the question that first presents itself.

1. It is not to our purpose to review all that has been advanced in controversy on this point. This would amount substantially to a repetition, in another form, of the de-

bates upon it in Congress. Not that such a course would be otherwise than proper, did it promise much avail to the result at which we aim. More is likely to ensue from the omission, as far as possible, of such details as have but enlarged the field of argumentation, without greatly facilitating the settlement of the question. We believe we shall succeed too well in showing, that our national course *under such circumstances as are affirmed in our President's annual message to Congress in December, 1846*, was morally and politically exceptionable. It is granted (and is little doubted by the present writer,) that those of our citizens officially concerned, either in the circumstances leading to the war, or in its operations, may be acquitted of peculiar personal blame in their contribution to the national error. Nor can it be doubted that the state of public principle—one of indifference it seems to have been—as to the moral evil of war, could and did alone permit *this* war to take place, by whatever party it was commenced, and to whatever degree the sense of the nation may have been opposed to its occurrence.

In the present argument, circumstances ordinarily of an estimate which we, as moralists, cannot accord to them—such as, the rights comprised in “military possession”—are necessarily introduced correspondingly to such estimate; as it enters into the present design to argue from the ordinary worldly acceptance of the circumstances at issue, to the conclusion that the war was unnecessary and morally inexpedient, whatever may be elicited on behalf of its justice.

2. On the part of the United States, the question was one of boundary simply, after Texas had been annexed to this country. On the part of Mexico, it was whether Texas should become annexed to the United States—toward which event she took an offensive position.

Texas is that part of this continent, which, after being in dispute between the United States and Spain, was ceded to the latter in the year 1819—extending, in the previously asserted claim of this country, westward from the Sabine to the Rio Grande. When certain of the Spanish colonies made themselves independent of Spain, the territories of Texas and Cohahuila united in forming one independent State. “The State constitution which they adopted, and

which was approved by the Mexican confederation, asserted that they were 'free and independent of the other Mexican United States, and of every other power and dominion whatever.' Such was the position of this State in the federal relation of the Mexican States. When that federal relation was dissolved, Texas and Cohahuila were, morally and politically, more than ever independent of the Mexican States, and of every other power and dominion whatever. In a comparative moral aspect, she was more independent of Mexico than of Spain; for she was disunited from Mexico, before the independence of the latter was acknowledged by Spain. The ground on which Mexico assumed that Texas was not independent of her, namely, her recognition withheld, if of any force, would show that Texas was independent of every country except *Spain*, at the time the former claimed her perfect independence.* Mexico then could with propriety claim Texas only as a cession from Spain; and that only as *implied* by the delivery to Mexico, and not to Texas, of those recognitions which were designed for Texas and other States, as well as Mexico. So that the single point to which the Mexican argument may be reduced, is, whether Spain so possessed Texas at that period, that she could present it to Mexico. Presuming that she did not, the annexation of Texas to this country required no consultation on the part of either Texas or the United States, with any foreign power. Moreover, Texas had been acknowledged by the world as an independent nation, even as Mexico had been during the same generation. Mexico having for many years abandoned Texas, as beyond her power to reconquer and as being in every respect independent of her, except that she had not, in words, abandoned the assertion of her claim, consented at length to yield that recognition, provided the subsequent national course of Texas—a part, at least of her future career—would be governed by antecedent restrictions from Mexico; which was the substance of the condition that she should not annex herself to the United States. The question evidently was not one that regarded property, but the balance of power. Mexico having objections, that were encouraged

* March 1836. Spain acknowledged the independence of the Mexican colonies at a subsequent date in that year.

by foreign governments, to the extension of the territory of the United States in that direction. But as argument on that foundation could be of no avail, her only prospect of an effective protest, as having herein the *sympathy* of great powers pledged to her, was in taking the position that Texas belonged to her until she should acknowledge its independence on her own optional conditions. Texas, being independent alike of any inherent or external force in the prohibition, accomplished the annexation. Mexico in consequence—we will not say, with some, “declared war,” but—addressed warlike expressions to the government of the United States, and rather threatened than assumed a warlike attitude. This was in effect all her conduct; though it may be admitted that the form of it was such as, in the code of the world, has usually been held to be provocative of war. In this country the national honor was not felt to require war as a consequence: nor did war ensue thereupon.

3. Looking further back in the order of time, there had been during several years a series of complaints on the part of the United States against Mexico, for wrongs committed on citizens of the former.* ‘The claims founded on them, and the acknowledgment of those claims by Mexico, were resolved into a stipulated debt from the Mexican government. The non-compliance of the latter with its engagement, left the wrongs as they previously stood.†

* They are thus summed up in a passage from a communication from Mr. Forsyth, the then American Secretary of State, dated May 27th 1837, addressed to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs:—“Treasure, belonging to the citizens of the United States, has been seized by Mexican officers, in its transit from the capital to the coast. Vessels of the United States have been captured, detained, and condemned, upon the most frivolous pretexts. Duties have been exacted from others, notoriously against law, or without law. Others have been employed, and in some instances ruined, in the Mexican service, without compensation to the owners. Citizens of the United States have been imprisoned for long periods of time, without being informed of the offences with which they were charged. Others have been murdered and robbed by Mexican officers, on the high seas, without any attempt to bring the guilty to justice.”

† There is wanting that analogy which has been alleged, between the claims of our government on Mexico, and those of individuals upon our non-paying States. The defection of these has involved no international question; partly because it is as one affecting their own citizens, it being but incidentally that foreigners participate in the effect; and partly, because our States, *separately*, are to foreign powers as mere companies. It should be further observed, that the debt of Mexico was not for money funded, but for

War however was not the result, even of a second violation of the terms by Mexico, or of her protracted indecision whether she would or would not accede to the proposed terms of a third convention relative to the subject. Nor does it appear that war was really contemplated by any party in connexion with those circumstances.

4. Subsequently to the matters of international controversy abovementioned, arose the Texan question previously stated. Both departments of controversy were associated in the object of a special mission offered by the government of the United States to that of Mexico, some time after intercourse between them had been suspended. The circumstances attending that suspension had been these. On the passage of a resolution by the Congress of this country in favor of the annexation of Texas, the Mexican Minister, resident in Washington, departed, after expressing to the Secretary of State the unfriendly terms which he held to exist between his government and that of the United States, by the fault of the latter. At the time of his preparation for departure, the Secretary of State, in reply to his inimical communication,* assured him that the "most strenuous efforts should be devoted to the amicable adjustment of every cause of complaint between the two governments, and to the cultivation of the kindest and most friendly relations between the sister republics."

"Notwithstanding Mexico had abruptly terminated all diplomatic intercourse with the United States," the President embraced what appeared to him to be "the earliest favorable opportunity 'to ascertain from the Mexican government whether it would receive an envoy from the United States, entrusted with full powers to adjust all the questions in dispute between the two governments.'" "The consul of the United States, at the city of Mexico,

personal injuries. If therefore the indemnity was unpaid, the injuries were unredressed.

* The Mexican Minister at Washington addressed a note to the Secretary of State, bearing date of the sixth of March 1845, protesting against the resolution referred to as "an act of aggression the most unjust that can be found recorded in the annals of modern history; namely that of despoiling a friendly nation, like Mexico, of a considerable portion of her territory;" and as an act "whereby the province of Texas, an integral portion of the Mexican territory, is agreed and admitted into the American Union." And he announced that, as a consequence, his mission to the United States had terminated, and demanded his passports, which were granted.—[*Pres. Mess.*

was therefore instructed by the Secretary of State, on the fifteenth of September, 1845, to make the inquiry of the Mexican government. The inquiry was made, and on the fifteenth of October, 1845, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mexican government, in a note addressed to our Consul, gave a favorable response, requesting, at the same time, that our naval force might be withdrawn from Vera Cruz, while negotiations should be pending. Upon the receipt of this note, that force was promptly withdrawn from Vera Cruz. A Minister was immediately appointed, and departed to Mexico." "To my surprise and regret, (continues the President,) "the Mexican government, though solemnly pledged to do so upon the arrival of our Minister in Mexico, refused to receive and accredit him. When he reached Vera Cruz, on the thirtieth of November, 1845, he found that the aspect of affairs had undergone an unhappy change. The government of General Herrera, who was at that time president of the republic, was tottering to its fall. General Paredes, a military leader, had manifested his determination to overthrow the government of Herrera by a military revolution; and one of the principal means which he employed to effect his purpose, and render the government of Herrera odious to the army and people of Mexico, was by loudly condemning its determination to receive a Minister from the United States, alleging that it was the intention of Herrera, by a treaty with the United States, to dismember the territory of Mexico, by ceding away the department of Texas. The government of Herrera is believed to have been well disposed to a pacific adjustment of existing difficulties; but, probably alarmed for its own security, and in order to ward off the danger of the revolution led by Paredes, violated its solemn agreement, and refused to receive or accredit our Minister; and this, although informed that he had been invested with full power to adjust all questions in dispute between the two governments. Among the frivolous pretexts for this refusal, the principal one was, that our Minister had not gone upon a special mission, confined to the question of Texas alone, leaving all the outrages upon our flag and our citizens unredressed. The Mexican government well knew that both our national honor and the protection due to our citizens imperatively requir-

ed that the two questions of boundary and indemnity should be treated of together, as naturally and inseparably blended; and they ought to have seen that this course was best calculated to enable the United States to extend to them the most liberal justice. On the thirtieth of December, 1845, General Herrera resigned the presidency, and yielded up the government to General Paredes. Although the prospect of a pacific adjustment with the new government was unpromising, from the known hostility of its head to the United States, yet, determined that nothing should be left undone on our part to restore friendly relations between the two countries, our Minister was instructed to present his credentials to the new government and ask to be accredited by it in the diplomatic character in which he had been commissioned. These instructions he executed by his note of the first of March, 1846, addressed to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs; but his request was insultingly refused by that Minister, in his answer of the twelfth of the same month. No alternative remained for our Minister but to demand his passports, and return to the United States.”*

There can be little question that it would have been greatly to the advantage of Mexico “that the two questions of boundary and indemnity should be treated of together.” She would probably have been released from the claims of the United States upon her for indemnity, on her restoring the hand of friendship and withdrawing from her attitude on the Texan question. This may be almost inferred from the president’s remark—“they ought to have seen that this course was best calculated to enable the United States to extend to them the most liberal justice.” But setting aside the duty of endeavoring to conciliate Mexico, the government might without impropriety have confined its communication to the old question of indemnity, and omitted all notice of Texas for the present, since it was not to obtain the recognition of that country as independent, that mention of it was made in connexion with the mission. The boundary question had not yet indispensably come up, and might have been adjourned, but for a two-fold consideration in the mind of our govern-

* President’s Message.

ment; namely, that Mexico being sore on the subject of the Texan annexation, was not in a disposition to satisfy our previous grievances; and that the combination of the two would suggest to Mexico a mode of obtaining reparation for the assumed wrong. The course *thus far* of our government, cannot, in our humble judgment, be surpassed for its moderation and good policy. With reference to Mr. Slidell's pressing his reception on the Mexican government, it may be remarked;—first, that Herrera's government could have gained nothing by Mr. Slidell's adoption of its suggestion (had it been in his power to do so,) to circumscribe his official character and the object of his mission, to that of a Commissioner on the Texan question; inasmuch as this question was the rock by means of which Herrera's government had been already doomed to a speedy downfall; and secondly, that our government would have gained nothing subsequently from Paredes by offering him the compromise that had been required by Herrera as the condition of Mr. Slidell's reception. The policy however of this government in presenting the subject *at all* to the government of Paredes, appears questionable, considering the "unpromising light," in which "the prospect of a pacific adjustment with the new government," appeared, "from the known hostility of its head to the United States." It would apparently have been more conducive to the interests of peace, had no intercourse been proposed to the then government of Mexico. A brief delay was not unlikely to usher into that nation councils more auspicious to a settlement of the matters at issue. And even if not, it had been better that our government had observed a continued, if not conclusive, silence on its claims to indemnity from a nation comparatively bankrupt, and not opened communication with Mexico on this or any other subject, until a question of boundary should be unavoidably raised. In the mean time, it might have exercised territorial administration between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, confining it for a period to the extent to which it had been been enforced by Texas. There is reason for supposing that, before the lapse of such a space of time as would exhaust the patience of our government, the question of boundary would have presented itself in the due course of events, as arising from the natural state of

things on the frontier. As for any supposed liability to disadvantage in not taking early possession of such frontier, we are perhaps justified in presuming that the passage of our vessels upon the Rio Grande, while it could not have been prevented by the Mexicans, would have sufficiently expressed our territorial claims, and contributed much to a virtual settlement of them.

5. It is in the order of argument that we now address some observations to the question of the boundary line between Texas and Mexico, in that region where it was an occasion of strife.

It is manifest that the limits of Texas, if ever distinct, could not be justly affected by the abolition of federal relations between her and other States; and therefore the judgment is erroneous that Texas had a right only to as much territory as she had held military possession of; for this is a false test of right, and one which those who apply it to the case of Texas do not acknowledge in other cases.

Again, it has been already stated that Texas and Cohahuila composed one State. Then it was only with the permission of the Government they had in common, that any portion of the State they composed could separate from the remainder—unless by a revolution in this State altogether distinct from such as might affect the whole State in its relation to the other Mexican States. Thus only could Texas and Cohahuila become separate and independent of each other. If, before their separation, there was strife between them as to union with the other States after the manner newly proposed, and if Cohahuila held Texas with her power as still a part of herself, then whether she united herself with the other States or not, she might with truth and propriety inform the world that her boundary extended eastward to the Sabine. If, on the other hand, Texas held Cohahuila in the manner conversely supposed, her boundary would extend much further westward than the Rio Grande. In that case, a Mexican occupation of Cohahuila by force would not, by itself, deprive Texas of her right to that territory. And if, simultaneously with such an occupation of Cohahuila, Texas became annexed to the United States, then the position of Cohahuila relatively to Texas would have been

conditionally this:—if she was not endeavoring or willing to effect her separation from Texas, it would have been analogous to that of New Mexico, if, at the time that province was held by the forces of the United States, and before it was ceded to the latter, Mexico had been voluntarily annexed to some other country. Texas and Cohahuila however did not question the independence of one another, when an opposition of their respective tendencies indicated that the time for its accomplishment had arrived. Cohahuila* yielded itself to Mexico; and if the people of that province have since pretended any claim to Texas, it has been only after the manner of, and in combination with, the other newly constituted provinces of Mexico.

Where then was the boundary line between Texas and Cohahuila after the separation between them? Either they had not time to bestow on the subject, or they deemed a constructive boundary sufficient; most probably the former circumstance led to the latter conclusion as at least a temporary one. They may have assumed either a demarcation established during the period of their union, or (if there were none such) one existing previously to that event. Of the former description there does not appear to have been any; so that our only resource is in one of the latter. And as this is equally the alternative left in the case of the other provinces on the Rio Grande opposite to Texas, antecedently to the confederation, the boundary question as to Cohahuila becomes blended with those as to the other provinces, New Leon and Tamaulipas—resolving them into one point, namely, the boundary between Texas and Mexico previously to their separation from Spain. The treaty between Spain and the United States in the year 1819—by which all the claims of the United States (just or unjust) from the Sabine to the Rio Grande were ceded to Spain—so far from throwing light over any past boundary, rather indicates that there was none *previously*, and tends to bury it if there was any. Had there been any distinct one, it would have greatly aided the solution

* Cohahuila was invaded by Mexico, and her senators imprisoned; but this was because they did not so far yield to the Dictatorship as to surrender all their arms, which every State was required to do. But they declined joining the Texan resistance to further dependence on Mexico.

of the point before us, provided no new one was subsequently established — and we know of none.* We do not say that there have been no definite statements made as to a boundary. There have been such at different times, proceeding from statesmen, geographers and travellers, but too conflicting to be profitably adduced on this occasion. Few if any geographical-historical questions have been so tantalizing as the present one, from its fertility of circumstances suggestive of inference, which alternate the balance of apparent right between the two sides, and from the deficiency of conclusive force on either of them. It is remarkable that local history of this importance should be wanting to so recent a period, and that its materials should be so conflicting.† A boundary question between obscure and hardly accessible villages, that have almost ceased to exist, could present scarcely greater obstacles to an arbitrator. It was a question in which arbitration could not well have pronounced a decision, if it were a condition that a river should be the line; although, if otherwise, there might have been less difficulty in such a mode of adjustment. It might have assigned to Mexico the settlements immediately on the east bank of the Rio Grande, and to Texas the remainder of the country west of the Nueces — a boundary which would have been manifestly inconvenient, and leading ultimately to endless disagreement among the borderers. It was a question then which could be properly settled only by an amicable arrangement, and an accommodating disposition between the parties concerned. It was not unreasonable in Texas to claim, on her separation from Mexico, a boundary which nature and history alike beheld with much favour; still less so in the United States to regard it in the light in which Texas had presented it, when Mexico refused to communicate to this Government even so much as a contradiction of the Texan representation, after being invited to an interchange of sentiments.

A question here arises, in what light should the settlements of Mexicans on the east side of the Rio Grande,

* "The detail of her (Mexico's) colonial history is buried in Spanish archives."
Meyer.

† This very mystery throws a classical halo around this and other points in the present subject, to one who has diligently investigated them.

opposite to New Leon and Tamaulipas, be regarded? Borders of countries are liable to indiscriminate settlement without necessarily affecting the citizenship of the settlers, or the boundary between the countries to which they are respectively subject. Nor is the accident of their being all citizens or subjects of the same country in itself sufficient to change the nationality of the soil. Mexican officers were indeed stationed there, in the exercise of jurisdiction. It was natural for the settlers in question, though in former times subject most probably to the Spanish governors of *Texas*, to look to the opposite side of the river for jurisdiction, now that the banks they occupied were apparently, at least for a time, beyond the notice of *Texas*, owing to the difficult occupation of her government at a great distance from the scene, as rendered necessary by recent events. Of these circumstances the Mexican authorities would be likely to take advantage, inasmuch as they were at hostilities with *Texas*, supposing that under other circumstances they would not have done so. We venture to express the humble opinion that the rights of *Texas* were not neutralized, though somewhat prejudiced, by neglect of *surveillance*, or by continued silence in her foreign* department. In like manner, the claims of Mexico were in *no greater* degree compromised during the period that *Texas* extended her jurisdiction westward of the Nueces, or when the forces of the United States occupied the west bank of that river.

It is of the highest importance to the argument, that Mexico claimed the country *west* of the Nueces on no other ground than she claimed that on the *east* side of the same river. She appears to have deemed it a compromise of her claim to *Texas* to argue the question of its extent in any direction save that towards the *Sabine*. We are not aware of any regard paid to the question of the west side of the Nueces, until Paredes, in his procla-

*She was not silent at home on the subject:—"During a period of more than nine years which intervened between the adoption of her Constitution and her annexation as one of the States of our Union, *Texas* asserted and exercised many acts of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants west of the Nueces. She organized and defined the limits of counties extending to the Rio Grande. She established courts of justice, and extended her judicial system over the territory," &c. (Pres. Message.) She had not *practically* extended it to the Rio Grande.

mation dated the 23d of April, immediately before the war, or, according to himself, after the war had commenced, remarks — "Hostilities have been commenced by the United States of North America, beginning new conquests upon the frontier territories of the departments of Tamaulipas and New Leon." The first occasion on which the west bank of the Nueces is mentioned by any Mexican authority, as a claim (so understood by some) independently of the comprehensive claim to Texas, is in the requisition made by the Mexican general, Ampudia, (Matamoras, April 12th, 1846,) to General Taylor, that he would "retire to the other bank of the river while our governments are regulating the pending question in relation to Texas." But there appears to be little frankness in this communication, inasmuch as General Ampudia must have been as well informed as General Taylor that (according to the reply of the latter of the same date,) "an envoy despatched to Mexico . . . had not been received by the actual Mexican Government, if indeed he had not received his passports and left the republic."

Further, the consent of Texas to the Nueces as a boundary to the once projected State, that was to have been the result of revolutionizing a small portion of Mexico, and to have been named "Rio Grande," does not involve, as it has been suggested, an incongruity with her claim to territory beyond it; for it was likely enough that, in her desire for the formation of a new State between herself and Mexico, she would contribute to that object a region which she could well spare to a friendly, and still more convenient, neighbour.

By the treaty of Santa Anna with Texas, while he was a prisoner of war, it has been contended that the boundary was adequately settled, it being therein agreed that it should be the Rio Grande. If, on the value of a treaty, of which differing estimates have been entertained by public men, that of an individual unlettered in the law of nations be worthy of any attention, we submit the following one, and without at all aiming at a middle or compromising view. Considering the constitutional independence of Texas, which rendered an invasion of it by Mexico quite different in principle from an invasion (say) of Ireland by England, in case there was set up in the latter country a

new form of government, to which the former would not submit—and considering that the war between Texas and Mexico consisted in a resistance by the former to an enterprise of Santa Anna for the purpose of subjecting her to his usurped dictatorship, she was entitled to the full benefit of his disclaimer of such pretension for the future, by whatever means she compelled it. It was a simple question of *force* on the part of Santa Anna; and it was by arms that Texas compelled the discontinuance of that force. By his treaty with her, proposed by himself, the independence of Texas was established, at least as far as the *military dictatorship* of Mexico was concerned in it; and his personal authority seems to be as plenary with reference to this matter, as his pretended one to overthrow the constitution of Texas, or to compel its subjection to a country, its confederation with which had been made to cease (and that by his act). Texas had both him and his army in her power;* and these availed themselves of the advantages conceded to them by this treaty. Santa Anna was acting, not as a minister of the Mexican nation, but as its military conqueror, with reference to the setting up of a new government in every State. He and those who succeeded to his position were bound by this treaty—one by which the very party that had set up the new order of things (Santa Anna and his forces) obtained their liberty. The treaty then is valid so far as it had respect to the freedom of Texas from future molestation—it being virtually a trial of right by force, in which she succeeded. But the question of boundary was not one that he could treat of, except *in cathedra*, or as accredited elsewhere; it being independent of the continuance or cessation of the federal relations. So that Texas could not with propriety claim the settlement of the boundary as by conquest. The objection that Santa Anna was in duress is valid as regards this last particular. It is not of equal force in both particulars, because in the former Texas demanded merely a desistance from violence—in the latter, a cession of that

* It appears singular that Texas did not liberate Cohahuila, and go to the assistance of Zacatecas. The revolt of Zacatecas belongs more to the romance of history, though less to world-history, than that of Texas.

which was not indisputably her territory. We are not brought by this section of the survey at all nearer to certainty as to a boundary line.*

In fine, the question of the western boundary of Texas, we may as well dismiss, as one that judgment cannot grasp. Nor is it indispensable to the moral argument on the war, as will duly appear. Indeed, as the parties who have approved of the war, have in general made up their minds that the Rio Grande was the true boundary previously to it, there appears to be little advantage gained by arguing the war question on any other assumption than that such was the boundary. Our argument is, in part, that, assuming such to have been the proper boundary, the war was nevertheless unjustifiable, and that, too, on other grounds than that of an exclusive Christian principle.

It is as well to remark, that whenever the Rio Grande has been here mentioned, with reference to the boundary of Texas, it is only within a limited latitude, and not to the full extent of the river course. New Mexico extends eastward of this river. "Santa Fé de Nuevo Mexico," which is east of it, is mentioned in the fifth article of the Mexican federation, as a separate "territory," after Texas and Cohahuila are included in one "State."† Texas, however, laid claim to that part of New Mexico, in defining her *revolutionary* boundary, as it has been termed. It is incorrectly so termed; for Texas was not revolutionized, but declined participation in that revolution which was introduced into the other States, and thus became affected in little other than an *extraneous* manner. In defining her boundary, so as to include New Mexico, it was implied that it became an object to her after hostilities had taken place between herself and Mexico.

* Santa Anna seems to have regarded the Rio Grande as the boundary line; though, if he did, that is no proof that it was so. The following language occurs in a proclamation of General Wall, issued by his order, dated June 20th, 1844 (as quoted by Mr. Rusk in Congress)—"Every individual who shall be found at the distance of one league from the left bank of the Rio Bravo, will be regarded as a favorer and accomplice of the usurpers of that part of the national territory, and as a traitor to his country; and, after summary military trial, shall be punished as such." By *that part of the national territory* is meant *Texas*.

† Appendix to Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 2d session, p. 385.

But it does not appear that she would have contested it with a nation at peace with her. How far up the east bank of the Rio Grande (allowing that river to be the western boundary) the territories of Texas extended, in other words, the northern boundary line of Texas, is not material to the question in which we are engaged, even were this line particularly distinct.

6. When the government of Mexico refused communication with that of the United States, on the application of the latter, through an express envoy, the government of the United States could but act on the best information it could obtain, with reference to the boundary of this country, at the frontier of Mexico. It was therefore *politically* warranted in stationing troops anywhere within the boundary line represented by Texas as her's, previously to the act of annexation; though it would not be morally warranted in making no discrimination between the historical line (wherever ascertainable) and the revolutionary one. Nor, in fact, was this government indiscriminate, as regarded New Mexico, the possession of which was not attempted. All the arrangements, however, should have been so made as to avoid, rather than evince a readiness for, the issue. The Americans were in quiet possession of the region west of the Nueces, with very little exception, whilst Gen. Taylor's force remained at Corpus Christi, near that river. "To repel any invasion of the Texan territory which might be attempted by the Mexican forces, it was deemed sufficient, in the spring of 1845, that our squadron had been ordered to the gulf, and our army to take a position between the Nueces and the Del Norte (or Rio Grande)." * It was in pursuance of this order that General Taylor took the position above mentioned. No Mexican forces had then crossed the Rio Grande; all was quiet as long as General Taylor remained near the Nueces. What then were the augmented necessities of the case which, in the following spring, impelled the advance of our army to the banks of the Rio Grande? There had been indeed a change of government—Herrera deposed—Paredes in power. "The partisans of Paredes (as our minister in the despatch referred to states,) breathed

* President's Message.

the fiercest hostility against the United States." The reconquest of Texas and war with the United States were openly threatened. These were the circumstances existing, when it was deemed proper to order the army under the command of General Taylor to advance to the western frontier of Texas, and occupy a position on or near the Rio Grande.* If these were all the circumstances that created the propriety of marching the troops from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande, in what remarkable particular did this propriety outweigh that which required the army to remain at the former station?—"the threatened invasion from Mexico?" There had been such menaces from Mexico for several years before our army entered Texas. If Mexico was until then unequal to the fulfilment of her menaces, or abstained from attempt to carry them into effect, what probability was there of her so doing, when our army was there? What effect had yet been consequent on the circular of Condé, the Mexican Minister of War, as far back as in July, 1845, announcing to various authorities that war was declared against the United States, and enunciating the vocabulary of military preparation? It has resulted as was apparently taken for granted that it would, there being at the time little curiosity as to what "might in that noise reside!"† The attitude of Mexico was subsequently scarcely more threatening than aforesaid. And without assuming it to have been the effect exclusively of our advanced position, experience has proved that collision—sanguinary collision—took place very soon afterwards; while there is far from being ground, as suggested by previous experience, for the expectation of such collision, had our army retained its position at Corpus Christi. It has been indeed stated, and we have no contradiction of it, that General Arista, commanding on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande, proposed to General Taylor that they should retain their relative positions, to avoid collision.‡ In fact, the object of the Mexican army crossing the Rio Grande does not appear to have been so much for the purpose of contesting a question of boundary—which would have been

* President's Message.

† Milton.

‡ Mr. Harper's Speech—Congr. Globe, Appendix, p. 203.

rather a refinement scarcely worth its while, considering the domestic circumstances of the nation, as for that of protecting her citizens on the east bank, who were regarded, though without sufficient reason, as molested by the approach of an American army—a motive anything but discreditable to Mexico. In so doing, however, she invaded a soil which this Government had been forced to regard as an appendage of the United States, by the refusal of Mexico to enter into any communication on the question whether it was a part of *Texas*. Nor should it be denied that the pointing of our guns opposite Metamoras* was not unlike a threatening demonstration to the Mexican forces: for, notwithstanding that the latter had set this example, they seem to have regarded it as originally the intention of the American general, without reference to what was done on the Mexican side. Had Gen. Taylor not shown his batteries in response to the measures on the Mexican side, it is highly probable that they would not have fired on his fort. But these active war-like preparations being accompanied by an exhibition to the Mexicans of the very small force at the fort, presented attractions scarcely resistible to a foe that had received authority to “attack by every means which war permits,” and “to

* As a great deal has been made of this circumstance, to the prejudice of the Government, it is proper to mention General Taylor's account of it. In his letter of March 29th, 1846, to the Adjutant General, he says:—“Our approach seems to have created much excitement in Metamoras; and a great deal of activity has been displayed since our arrival, in the preparation of batteries. The left bank is now under the reconnoissance of our engineer officers, and I shall lose no time in strengthening our position by such defensive works as may be necessary, employing for that purpose a portion of the heavy guns brought round by sea. The attitude of the Mexicans is so far decidedly hostile. An interview has been held, by my direction, with the military authorities of Metamoras, but with no satisfactory result.”

On the 6th of April, he thus wrote:—“The Mexicans still retain a hostile attitude, and have thrown up some works, evidently designed to prevent us from crossing the river. . . . On our side, a battery for four eighteen-pounders will be completed, and the guns placed in battery to-day. These guns bear directly upon the public square of Metamoras, and within good range for demolishing the town. Their object cannot be mistaken, *and will, I think, effectually restrain him from any enterprise upon our side of the river.* A bastioned field fort, for a garrison of 500 men, has been laid out by engineers in rear of the battery, and will be commenced immediately.”

It is manifest, from some of the above expressions, that it was not intended to provoke the Mexicans to commence hostilities.

destroy wherever they might find" our army.* We say they received *authority*—for we can hardly regard as *orders* what were sounded for popular effect, and which the Mexican commanders do not appear to have held as obligatory. Nor do we believe that until they *saw* our army, the Mexicans believed themselves to be actually at war, *more than they had been for a long while*. This is evinced by the whole of their proceedings. They were then insulted by the smallness of the apparently challenging force—little more than 3,000 men (and these divided in order to maintain two positions); and they were attracted by the opportunity of capturing a hated adversary. But if, at the time of their crossing the river, it had been intended as a step merely collateral with our own movement, for the purpose of a joint possession until a further attempt at a settlement should be made by the two governments, however singular if not unprecedented would have been the relative position of the two armies, it is more than probable that no blow would have been struck by our own.† The Mexicans, however, announced a far different intention, and aggressively pursued it, making the first positive demonstration of—or placing beyond question the existence of—that state of war, which may be considered as having been simultaneously entered into. Such was the origin and commencement of the Mexican war—a war which, tested by the principles which have ordinarily governed what is called the civilized world in its international relations, was and will be pronounced (we have no doubt) by posterity to have been, on the part of the United States, one of the most *just* wars that have blotted with gore the history of man—a war that might nevertheless have been avoided by the United States, had they been so disposed, probably without diminution of an inch of territory, certainly without detriment to their soil or their people, or

* Letter from the Mexican Minister of War to the Mexican general near the Rio Grande, quoted in the President's Message.

† Orders had indeed been given by this Government (August 25th, 1845,) that the crossing of the river should be regarded as hostile; but considering the associations which led to such order, the above speculation is not excluded by it. Besides, Mr. Secretary Marcy's order of July 8th, 1845, is expressly, that Mexican troops, if any were found to be already on our side of the Rio Grande, should not be molested unless an actual state of war should exist.

even what is called their honour—a war, consequently, which no degree of political justice (in the ordinary sense of the expression,) could morally justify.

Before taking leave of the question of the origin of the war, an observation or two shall be submitted, on certain principles of policy, by which the Government and the public spirit of this country was in great measure influenced antecedently to the rupture with the sister republic.

1. Allusion has been made to the great moderation which characterized this Government in its advances to that of Mexico. This, instead of diminishing, (as maintained by the President,) rather augmented the duty of a continued abstinence from the semblance of any different course; for what harm resulted from the extent to which moderation *was* carried?—To give vent to her feelings in expressions of disdain, menace, triumph, declaration of war, and of whatsoever else had long been conventionally, as it were, a privilege of Mexico. It was a very material element of gratification to her—a field for the play of exuberant impulse. What if she evinced a more than ordinary passion in her sport, and bounded, full of life and fire, on the banks of the Rio Grande—feigning, now encounter, now retreat! If these movements on her own side of the river were to be regarded with suspicion by ourselves, excusable might be the suspicions of a Mexican force, at the movements, on disputed soil, of an army representing a matter-of-fact people. Again, it should be borne in mind that, previously to the war, Mexico was not alone in the opinion that she had been injured. The press of the greatest nations had done much to flatter that impression. The diplomacy of those nations had still greater effect, interested as they were in the independence of Texas. We repeat, then, that over and above the duty of our government to exercise very tender moderation towards Mexico, as it certainly did for a while, the very consideration of its having so done, in virtue of that point of Christian civilization at which we profess to have arrived, laid it under the greater obligation towards her, as a neighbor, to persevere in the same policy. Any wanton misconstruction of it would be removed, sooner or later—and what if a generation passed away in the interval? Not all the advantage, in the form manifested hitherto, that Mexico could have taken of our

deportment in that period, or even in any space of time, (considering that the interruption of relations gave her little opportunity,) was worth a single citizen, or would justify the sacrifice of one. Our "strength was to sit still;" and so long as we were so doing, Mexico *did* us no harm, whatever she might have in store.

2. Again, it has been the policy approved by many as being that of the administration, though not represented as such by authority, that it was important for a threatening foe to be made aware that delay in entering upon war when necessary, would not present itself as an impediment growing out of our constitution, as imagined by some, at all events by the Mexican government. And although this is not submitted as any part of the policy that should contribute to a war, yet it is confidently held up as a justification of the government, in not consulting with Congress before marching the forces to the Rio Grande. The executive commission does not appear to have been transcended in any way. But, to order the army as the President did, in his capacity of Commander-in-chief, to the seat of impending strife, at a time when the irritation of Mexico was at its height, without consultation with Congress *then in session*, seems to have implied either an opinion of the unconcern of every one, who was not a member of the administration, in the movements of the army and in the consequences of such, or else an apprehension that his plans would not be concurred in by the representatives of the people. It is not herein meant that he should have submitted to Congress a question of the boundary of Texas to be assumed, as that matter was not necessarily in point, at least just then, but a question as to the most expedient course under the circumstances newly presented to his notice as of increased warlike aspect. Delay would not necessarily result from so doing, in case of invasion; inasmuch as whatever the executive may do without consulting Congress, it may do (it is presumed) without awaiting its decision, if too tardy for the emergency. Further, since an inference in favor of the impulse under consideration, has been drawn from an impression on the part of the Mexican government, that by the Constitution of the United States, the President alone had not power to take requisite measures for the defence of the country, and

that the Congress and people of the United States would not sustain the President in the warlike purpose attributed to him; on the other hand, it is not an ill-founded presumption that the Mexican government felt secured by the supposed trammels of our government, against the occurrence of any collision before our army marched to the Rio Grande; and that, all its official declarations notwithstanding, the government and people of Mexico had not more prospect of a military encounter than did the people of the United States, until the first blood had been spilt.

3. Again, it appears to have been a paramount principle in the mind of our President, to associate a scheme in Mexico for the establishment of a monarchy there, with the necessity for resistance to it by the United States. Paredes was supposed to entertain the project. If there were a prospect of his success, then, it is to be inferred from the President's intimation, that warlike preparations would be necessary. Whether this necessity would be created by the simple fact of a monarchy being established in Mexico, or by the selection of a European prince, is not clearly discriminated in the form of intimation adopted by him. But he appears to assume that an election to the contemplated throne of Mexico must be made from European candidates. On the other hand, an exercise by Mexico of her right to choose her own form of government, does not appear to involve the necessity of her acceptance or even toleration of European intervention. The idea of any other opposition to her free choice than is implied by the exercise of influence, tends greatly to the injury of the republican character. Inasmuch as the question was not connected with the recent collision with Mexico, save through the mention of it by the President as adding justification to his policy, we have to do with it only so far as it is associated with the danger of entertaining the principle of intervention with the domestic affairs of another nation, at a period when we are in controversy with her on international points; so liable is this superfluous prepossession to affect the natural course of the independent questions.

4. Another ascendant impulse avowed, not by the government, but by the party encouraging the war, was the importance to our interests that we should use the occa-

sion presented by the offences of Mexico, to present evidences of our warlike capacities to the rest of the world, in which (it is said) there has long been an assumption of our very limited capacities of that nature, through our independence of standing armies. Evidences of national power have indeed been furnished in the aptitude for military discipline evinced by the modest novices sent to the field of action against multiplied hosts, and in the readiness which answered the summons for volunteer forces to any requisite number. In addition to which it may be remarked that the Northern line of our country was not in requisition for its masses, which had not, on this occasion of Southern warfare, those calls of interest which would have roused them had it been a Northern blast that sounded.* This difference in circumstances between the two atmospheres of warfare, is worthy of consideration from those who have cast on our government the imputation of adopting a different policy respecting Oregon from that respecting Texas. The truth is, that advances were made to Mexico which were never made to Great Britain. Towards the latter nation, a deportment of a far different character was called in question on both sides of the ocean. The only semblance of analogy between the two cases, antecedently to the final issues of conduct in each of them respectively, consists in this;—our government had transactions with each, of a nature which partly for euphony, and partly in deference to the quality of the “high contracting parties,” is called *diplomacy*. Mexico living in an

* Mr. Polk remarked in his last annual message, that the nation could at any time command “two millions such as fought the battles in Mexico.” General Taylor has been reported to have said in one of his speeches—“we are a nation of soldiery!”—Both meant, no doubt, merely the contrast to the state of things implied by the following speech:—“I would demand and question, if I should not displease, how many knights be there now in England, that have the use and exercise of a knight? that is, to wit, that he knoweth his horse, and his horse him; that is to say, he being ready at a point to have all things that belongeth to a knight, an horse that is according and broken after his hand, his armour and harness mete and so forth, et cetera. I suppose, and a due search should be made, there be many founden that lack.” This passage is from “The Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry, or Knyghthode, translated out of Frensshe into Englisshe, by me William Caxton”—one of Hartshorne’s “Book Rarities of the University of Cambridge,”—“supposed to have been printed in 1484”—“one of the most interesting and rare volumes from Caxton’s press.” It is in the Pepysian Library of Magdalene College, Cambridge.

ideal* world—her policy being in character with it—knew not how to entertain the proposition made to her. What place could it obtain in the romance of Mexican history?—and how could it be apprehended by the strings of the Southern lyre?—England has acted in *her* national spirit, which on the other hand was towards a practical end. She ascertained that her interest required no more than had been previously proposed to her, but which she had then declined—while the American government preferred its claim to a higher latitude merely to draw from *her* the proposition of that which she had formerly refused, since *this* government could not (as appeared to itself,) again propose it. Now the circumstances attendant on the settlement of this very question, while so far from involving this nation in any just charge of partiality or infirmity of deportment, is itself proof enough of the absence of any necessity for military demonstration to the world for its recognition of our national weight and power. Those who contend for the need of such demonstrations, are inconsistent with the tone of triumph, in some of them at least, at the Oregon settlement—attributing, as some did, the final course of England to a sense of her interest in avoiding a collision with this country. A sense of interest on her part might have been estimated with sufficient correctness without military associations. Moreover, the objects of our government were obtained without the last military preparation—and, that, when expressions publicly used by the President had created an apparently greater necessity for such preparation than appeared under other circumstances. Could we, then, by any amount of military demonstration, have procured more of due respect than was shown by England while we were quite unarmed, and unguarded in every way, even in *words*?—An indication not very remote as to time, of the respect in which this country is held, and of its weight abroad, is the effect of a protest by General Cass, on his own personal responsibility, against the ratification of the Quintuple treaty; by allowing which it was considered that the position taken by this country, as

* This term is here used in its vulgar sense.

to the right of other powers to search its vessels, would have been compromised. We should like to be informed what government, besides that of Mexico, has treated this country with disrespect since the war of 1812—such as to render expedient new proofs occasionally of our national capacities as indicated by military exploits? Even now, which is the most obvious of the results from the recent war, the better establishment of the prowess of this nation, or the diminished estimate of that manifested by Mexico? However justice to both nations may assert the former, there appears to have been a much stronger impression of the latter in the world. Mexico has received far more justice to her valour—less energetic, less directed though it was—from her foe than from other nations, which, mortified at her unequal competition, have withheld the sympathy they promised.

We hope to have shown that, whatever pretence nations may put forth as to the expediency of display in military adventure to command respect, it appears in the light of singular absurdity as coming from *this* nation.

We have now animadverted on those features in the recent public spirit of this country, and in that of its government, which could not but be deemed as of appropriate notice, in connexion with the circumstances that originated the war.

II. We proceed to remark on some of the circumstances most striking in a *moral* aspect in the *progress* and *conduct* of the war.

I. As soon as practicable after information of the first collision between the forces of the United States and those of Mexico, the Congress of the former declared the country to be in a state of war. This was true in a literal sense. But when the enemy had retired beyond the Rio Grande, which he did after the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, the war might have been desisted from with greater honour to the United States, both in their own estimation, and in that of other nations, than characterized their use of the occasion to invade the country of their vanquished foe. It is hardly credible that Mexico would have attempted another invasion; for, however ready again and again for renewed combat, it was

thenceforth defensively against invaders. At all events, such a result should have been awaited. Conceding that there were some reasonable objections to this course, while diplomacy continued silent between the two countries, yet as the policy of our government was to present repeated propositions to that of Mexico, it was manifestly to the prejudice of this policy that our army was permitted to advance into the Mexican territory. Not only was the exasperation of the enemy increased, and his affectation of national honour more provoked, but his sense of interest and self-preservation were not likely to receive the impression we would fain produce, if, at the same time, we were feeding his hopes of retaliation by the very fact of our advance into his country, besides that of the comparative smallness of our invading force. Not until the capital of Mexico had fallen, was the enemy's hope, till then constant as a vestal lamp, extinguished. His sense of honour could all along afford any loss, if only by and by he might gain some advantage, at whatever sacrifice to himself; and he could not allow himself to doubt that, sooner or later, such would accrue to his patience for revenge. Nor is it improbable that he indulged in visions of intervention from those great powers, which having acknowledged the independence of Texas, were interested in the proviso of Mexico, that she should not annex herself to any other power. It has been credited to the government by its opponents, that the unpacific results to its proffer of the olive-branch while our army was on the soil of Mexico, were in accordance with its aim—a judgment we are afraid to pass!—In our advance towards *conquest*, no great difference would have been made by some delay in crossing the Rio Grande, (say, till the next rejection of pacific terms). In our advance towards *peace*, by remaining altogether on our own side of the river, we would probably have gained materially. In our advance towards *either*, we had lost nothing ultimately by even resuming our old 'position at Corpus Christi.'

That there was little anticipated expediency in hastening the pursuit of advantages, appears to have been admitted by the previous deficiency of military preparation. Witness the state of General Taylor's forces antecedently

to the actions of the eighth and ninth of May.* When intercourse was temporarily cut off between the general and the little garrison of Point Isabel, there were but a few hundred in the latter place. An overwhelming body of Mexicans threatened it; other large detachments of the enemy were being landed. In the fort (opposite to Metamorast) where General Taylor was, there were little provisions remaining. And as Point Isabel was the main depot, containing almost all the provisions and ammunition of his army, it was indispensable that the general should effect a junction with that point. But before he could be apprized of its situation, the only means on which the two points could depend for intercommunication, consisted in the mission of Captain Walker and a few men, who almost "against hope," arrived in safety at the general's camp. General Taylor had then to adventure the perilous enterprise of advancing to Point Isabel with a small force (his main one) divided into three small sections. He arrived after two days' march without opposition. But he had necessarily left the little garrison of the fort greatly exposed, and with little means of defence. The Mexicans on the opposite bank, at Metamoras, availed themselves of his departure with the main force, by making exertions to destroy the fort; while it had also to defend itself for a hundred hours against assault from surrounding forces, during which time they lost their commander, major Brown. It was therefore a point of importance to the general, when some days had elapsed, to obtain information of the condition and prospects of the fort. For the attainment of this object he was dependent on such good fortune as might attend the exposure of a hundred men under captain May, in opening the communication. There was much to sicken even the stout hearts of those who, in the interval that followed, awaited their return. May, with his band, escaped observation from the enemy. On arriving within a few miles of the fort, he halted, as directed, and sent to the fort a party under captain Walker; who not returning as expected, the party concluding that he had been captured,

* The whole army on the frontier consisted of about 3500 men; and all the land forces of the United States little more than 7000.

† This fort was afterwards named Fort Brown by General Taylor, in memory of the commander of the little garrison, who was killed.

returned without him to Point Isabel, bearing thither no information whatever from the fort, and encountering superior forces on their way. Walker however appeared unexpectedly, with a favorable report from major Brown, who had not then fallen. We are not engaged in writing a narrative of the events that occurred during the war: but these circumstances are referred to as indicative of the adoption of slender means of defence at a time when the government was anticipating the menaced invasion. Nor can the alarm be forgotten which pervaded the United States, at the situation of General Taylor, after the war had commenced. These limited preparations under such expectations, show little idea of accomplishing more than a defensive object. The order from the government to cross the river, if necessary, ill accorded with such little preparation. It could not have been executed without the previous successes which were marvellously gained under all the circumstances—for it was before the arrival of the reinforcements, which were sent for no other object than that of relieving the General from the predicament in which he was placed between Point Isabel and the fort. On the ground, then, even of the defensive attitude of the government, we cannot but suspect our protest to be morally sustained against shifting the scene of war to the opposite banks of the Rio Grande*—a result which, as we contend, was needless to the conqueror, and far otherwise than consistent with the renewed offer of the olive-branch. Alas! how heedless was it of the peace, the blood, the lives, the varied and incalculable interests of many thousands of human beings!

2. After many battles won, and territories gained by the United States, it was found that the Mexicans were not the more disposed to—what? *seek* for peace?—*grant* it to the United States?—for our armies truly carried the olive-branch wherever they went, although they were on the enemy's *undisputed* soil. The question was then mooted in this country, as to a settlement of the question of boundary in a new and peculiar way. It was proposed that we should abstain from further progress in the enemy's country, partly on principle, partly to spare ourselves

* The previous order to pursue the enemy across the river, if attacked by him, does not imply the perseverance of war on the other side.

further labour and expense, and that we should remunerate ourselves for that already incurred, by proceeding to reckon at once without our host—to draw a line separating such Mexican territory as we had taken from such as we had not taken, substituting that line for the Rio Grande as a boundary. It is but justice to both parties—that in favour of the war, and that opposed to it—to report that this proposed measure was not peculiar to either of them. Nor was it proposed in any spirit but that of a sincere desire to end the war, a termination of which appeared to be, for the present, accessible in no other way. Leaving the question of the practicability of this course to professed statesmen, who indeed disposed of it, our stricture upon it is applied to its moral merit. It really seems that, without the consent of Mexico, we had no justification in adopting any line of boundary beyond the Rio Grande; and that from the time we crossed that river, our duty to return to our own side of it was unvarying during the whole of our progress, and uncompromised by any circumstances attending that progress—least of all by our too great pride to return in consequence of the construction to which it might have been liable. Yet, the further we had advanced, and the more prowess we had manifested, so much the more real independence and sense of honour would have been our proved qualities had we then retired. Not doing so, however, we had not a better right to define with pickets a boundary any where between the Rio Grande and the capital of Mexico, than to define on paper one between that city and the frontier most remote from our possessions. The fact is, that, so long as we adhered to the purpose of remaining on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande, there could be no stopping point, until an adjustment of the difficulties between the contending nations should be effected by a treaty. The capture of the city of Mexico removed the necessity for the continued advance of the army, as the proceedings of the Mexican nation, consequent on such an event, would be indicative of its final purpose whether or not to come to any terms with us. The occasion was very properly used by the commanding general, representing the American government. The Mexicans were indulged with the tardiness natural to them, which they evinced

to a degree hardly compatible with a desire that the military possession of their country by the enemy should cease.

The treaty by which the war was brought to a close was such as, on the whole, might have been fairly expected. If it be an admissible principle that war may with propriety be waged against another power by which we have been aggrieved, in order to obtain redress, then a treaty which deprived Mexico of nearly all the territories we had occupied, but which awarded to her a sum of money as a balance arithmetically due to her, is not exceptionable as to these particulars. Among the articles are some* borrowed from the treaty of 1785, between this country and Prussia, and originated by Franklin, who signed the treaty while resident Minister in France. They provide for the settlement of future international differences by arbitration, and for the mitigation of the severities of warfare, should it occur between the parties treating. These provisions, without precedent at the period of the former treaty, were highly honorable to the nation by whose accredited negotiator they were offered, and to international law, to which they imparted a more chastened spirit. The repetition of such principles in the latter treaty were more than apposite. And, considering the position previously taken by Mr. Polk in the Oregon dispute, against recourse to arbitration as an expedient for the settlement of difficulties, his consent to this insertion is the more creditable to him, inasmuch as both his prejudice and his sense of committal gave way to a consideration of humanity with reference to an unseen future. It ought not, however, to be overlooked that the spirit which entered into the treaty with Prussia was in advance of that which treated with Mexico, inasmuch as *not all* the generous provisions comprised in the former were adopted in the latter†. That “contained his (Franklin’s) philanthro-

* See the 21st and 22nd articles of the Mexican treaty.

† In Lyman’s “Diplomacy of the United States,” it is remarked of these provisions, that “it does not appear that they have been of any practical utility to the world.” Possibly, this consideration suggested the omission of them in the late treaty. But while the world is advancing, its past deficiencies should not be assumed as an earnest of its future conduct. The sooner we can say “old things are passed away,” the better.—The treaty with Mexico has been represented as having been produced in the Ameri-

pic article against *privateering*, and in favour of the *freedom of trade*, and of the protection of private property *in time of war*. The king of Prussia made no objection to this article. On the contrary, his ambassador, the Baron de Thulemsier, who signed the treaty, felicitated the commissioners on its being introduced." The 'twenty-third article is directed,' said he, 'by the purest zeal in favour of humanity. Nothing can be more just than your reflections on the noble disinterestedness of the United States of America. It is to be desired, that these sublime sentiments may be adopted by all the maritime powers without exception. The calamities of war will be much softened; and hostilities often provoked by cupidity and the inordinate love of gain, will be of more rare occurrence." Free ships were likewise to make free goods,* and contraband merchandize was exempted from confiscation. He (Franklin) fondly hoped that these benevolent principles would be wrought into the law of nations; but the example has not been followed.† The remaining provisions of the treaty with Mexico were adapted to the accommodation of the two nations, and principally Mexico, as regarded the protection of society on the frontier. On the part of both sides it was a very liberal treaty. At the same time, though abounding in humane provisions, it was less so than Franklin—and he not a mere theorist, but a practical man—would have rendered it.

3. Not the least important feature in the conduct of the administration with reference to the war, is the recommendation to Congress to authorize by legislation the issue

can Senate, in the hand-writing of the British Agent in Mexico. Whoever made the extracts from the Prussian treaty by authority, is the party to be blamed for the omission of those creditable parts alluded to, unless he was expressly desired to omit them.

* This particular had been originated and adopted by the Northern powers.

† Jared Sparks' Life of Franklin—1844. To the above extract the following note is added:—"Washington spoke of this treaty in terms of high commendation. In a letter to the Count Rochambeau, he said:—'The treaty of amity, which has lately taken place between the king of Prussia and the United States, marks a new era in negotiation. It is the most liberal treaty which has ever been entered into between independent powers. It is perfectly original in many of its articles; and should its principles be considered hereafter as the basis of connection between nations, it will operate more fully to produce a general pacification, than any measure hitherto attempted amongst mankind.—July 31st 1786."

of *letters of marque*.* Conceding the propriety of all other modes of warfare prevalent among civilized nations, there is not a single admissible argument in favour of a legalized molestation of private property on the high seas, the thoroughfare of nations: singular it is that the nineteenth century (the first half of it we should say—for there is hope of the remainder) should either have so little apprehension of its own advancement as to tolerate such a system, or, while tolerating it, cherish the delusion of its present assumed position in civilization!† The more remarkable is this, in that the powers by which alone it can be sustained or put down, are those Anglo-Saxon nations which are preeminently commissioned to the diffusion of humanity, and in which the earth's fairest prospects are, to all present appearances, bound up. Are these nations awaiting an example from some of less pretensions?‡ Would that Mexico had set the example when the recent hostilities broke out! she had little to sacrifice to the principle. Nor even after the course adopted by her government, in the offer of commissions to privateers from Spanish colonies—effects from which incipient course were all contravened by the relations existing between Spain and this country—would it have been too late to have done so in reply to the contemplations of our government. She may yet do so. And as expectation is not always prepared for the approaching developement or revival of a dormant principle, let us not, in our vanity, exclude all idea of being hailed from quarters whence we little expect it, equally to our shame and to our benefit. Eminent will be the nation, in the eyes of the contemporary world and of posterity, which shall first proclaim the lesson that the privateering system, however legalized, is an outrage on civilization, even though adopted as a retaliatory course. Pi-

* Congress did not act on this part of the President's Message.

† The subject was to have been discussed at the Panama Convention, in 1826, had it been well attended.

‡ It should be mentioned that, in the framing of the first definitive treaty between Great Britain and the United States, in 1783, "the American Commissioners drew up a series of new articles, chiefly relating to commerce, which they were willing should be inserted, and which embraced Dr. Franklin's philanthropic scheme for protecting private property in time of war, and for suppressing the practice of privateering. None of them were accepted." *Spark's Life of Franklin*.

racy it is ; *declared* piracy is all that it ought to be. And so to have declared it, when the inestimable opportunity for so doing was presented at the commencement of the Mexican war, would have exalted our government, our Congress, and our nation. Nor would such a stand have involved this country in the risk of any sacrifice worth naming, for, to use the expressions of the President,—“ It is true that there are but few if any commercial vessels of Mexico upon the high seas ; and it is therefore not probable that many American privateers would be fitted out, in case a law should pass, authorizing* this mode of warfare.” If it be the duty of our fleets to check violence on the high seas as a marine police, their proper duty cannot but include the protection *equally of Mexican commerce as of our own*, notwithstanding the hostilities existing between the two nations. One may be excused for expressing so much surprise that, in the provisions of the recent treaty for mitigating the inhumanity of future wars, the golden opportunity was not used to procure the abolition of privateering, by the two nations in common, when the reference made to Franklin’s treaty could hardly have failed to suggest it.

4. There is a circumstance in the conduct of the administration, while carrying on the war, that calls for separate notice in this series of remarks. The terms of the capitulation of Monterey, while they were generous to the enemy, in so far as concessions were made to his feelings, were likewise, so far as the armistice was concerned, far from adverse to the interests of our army, whose sufferings needed alleviation by repose—comparatively such. And what did this respite amount to, as proposed?—merely to a cessation from hostilities until a day little later than that at which an injunction to renew hostilities could arrive. The circumstance that such an order was sent, when it could little effect results, has brought much censure on the government, as being expressive of a dissatisfaction little called for. The mandate for the cessation of the armistice, when so little was to be gained by interrupting it, does however admit of this liberal construction—that it was

* As the *other* modes of warfare are not considered to require special legislation, to authorize them, why should *this* require it, unless it be, that this is even more unnatural than all others ?

deemed expedient to avoid confirming any impression in the Mexican mind, that the resources of this government were in a state to need any intermission of the contest. Still it appears to have escaped the reflection of the government, how ill a moral effect may be produced on the general proceedings of the commander, if he is led, by such a course as was their's in this particular, to anticipate the refusal of sanction to other measures of like character, on occasions when humanity may be even less able to dispense with them.

5. In the military conduct of the war, we may with feelings of gratulation ascribe to the commanding Generals of the American forces, at least as great examples of both unavenging and active humanity as the annals of war can present. Their deportment has maintained a congruity with that part of their vocation which consisted in representing a humane country, entitled to expect in her sons when abroad the best illustration of this characteristic. The magnanimous sacrifices made by General Taylor of advantages to the enemy, at Buena Vista* at the risk both of loss to his own army, and of compromise to his prospect of victory, merely to honor a white flag from a "*notus Ulysses*," when, under the circumstances of the two armies, it could hardly wear a pacific expression, seem almost to transcend a just claim to approbation—exposing, as it did, his own army (which seemed thrice to have lost the battle before it was won) to the perfidy and wantonness of that tried individual. But great was the *self-sacrifice* to which it also tended.†

* Santa Anna sent a white flag at a period of the action at which his army was placed to manifest disadvantage from the American fire, but was yet far from being defeated. His real object was presumed by every one, before it could be proved, to be merely that of gaining time to remedy the disadvantage. He is reported to have even re-commenced his fire before the parley had ceased. It is to be hoped that this is an improvement (if there can be any) on his breach of faith. Another object gained by this white flag, was the certainty of General Taylor's position, a fire being immediately opened upon his person.

† The following handsome testimony, published in some of the public journals, is from a young sergeant:—"I have seen cruelty and inhumanity on the part of subordinate officers to their men—inhuman punishments inflicted for slight offences, *but never in the presence of General Taylor*—who was always a kind father and protector to the poor soldier, and whom every honest soldier in the army loved. No man of honor who ever served under him will charge him with cruelty, either to his own troops or to the enemy.

The chivalry of Scott conceded, after every battle, to prisoners who had made themselves conspicuous for military qualities, *liberty without parole*, in consideration of the degree to which they evinced those very qualities which rendered them formidable. It was *his* wise moderation and heroic independence, that for a while denied to himself and to his elated army, the scarcely resistible enjoyment of a triumphant entry into the city of the Montezumas, in order to spare the feelings of a prostrate foe, by yielding to him—thanklessly as it issued—the opportunity of an honorable peace without the walls. He declared, moreover, that the great triumph he sought was a peace, as honorable to Mexico as to his own country.*

Various circumstances of exception to the discipline maintained by the two Generals mentioned, have been pointed at, but invariably with a captious spirit. There is indeed one of these worthy of notice—namely the refusal of Gen. Scott to comply with the request of the foreign Consuls in Vera Cruz, that he would grant a respite from the siege till the women and children could leave the city. But those who have made this a peculiar charge against his fair name, have lost sight of the circumstance that before the commencement of the siege he had particularly advised

After the capture of Matamoras, instead of using one of the houses in the city as his quarters, he gave them all up to the sick, wounded, and suffering soldiers, and slept in his tent on a bed that was not more than four inches above the mud and water that surrounded it." * * * "He never turned away from a suffering soldier without doing all that he could to relieve and cheer him. On the march to Seralvo," continued the youth, "my strength gave out, and if it had not been for Gen. Taylor, I might have been left upon the road to die or be murdered. But he saw me, and knew from my looks that I was exhausted. He took me up and sat me on his own mule, and I rode with him in that way for several days."

"At one time we were almost out of provisions. We had nothing to eat but musty biscuit and magotty pork. An officer went to General Taylor, and complained that he could not eat such food. 'Well, sir,' said the General, 'come and take your dinner with me.'

"The invitation was gladly accepted, and the officer, anticipating a first rate dinner, dressed himself up, and went to the quarters of the General; but instead of finding a regular dinner table, filled with delicacies, he saw the General sitting before a fire, toasting a piece of the same pork on a stick, and that, with some musty biscuit and a little bean soup, made the dinner for himself and the disappointed officer, who expected to dine on roast beef and plum pudding. That gentleman didn't eat any more dinners with General Taylor."

*The author is indebted to Mr. Gardiner, the Spanish Secretary of General Scott, for information of this circumstance.

the removal of the parties in question. His subsequent refusal was founded on circumstances which led him to suspect the motives for the application.* It does seem indeed that, to one who could not have distrusted his prospect of success, the space of half a day, if even that space was indispensable for the object in view, would have made but little difference, whatever advantage of a different kind could have been taken by the enemy. But it cannot be made to appear, that the General was less considerate of the situation of women and children, than the most humane besiegers of cities, revolting as is a *system* from which events of this nature do, and (as it appears) must have birth.

The conduct of the American forces in general was chequered with good and evil, as will hereafter be shown. It is hard to determine which should be *expected* to predominate. On one hand, it would seem that, in an army from a civilized country, savage conduct would be the probable exception. Yet, on the other, in a band trained to the most effective means of violence and blood-shedding, it really does seem rather exacting on human nature, thus inflamed and thus exposed, to expect from it other than the reverse. According to General Scott, indeed, there were but "few bad men in this army" against whom "the

* "I enclose a copy of a memorial received last night, signed by the consuls of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Prussia, within Vera Cruz, asking me to grant a truce to enable the neutrals, together with Mexican women and children, to withdraw from the scene of havoc about them. I shall reply, the moment that an opportunity may be taken, to say—First, That a truce can only be granted on the application of Governor Morales, with a view to surrender; second, That in sending safeguards to the different consuls, beginning as far back as the 13th instant, I distinctly admonished them, particularly the French and Spanish consuls—and, of course, through the two, the other consuls—of the dangers that have followed; third, That although, at that date, I had already refused to allow any person whatsoever to pass the line of investment either way, yet the blockade had been left open to the consuls and other neutrals to pass out to their respective ships of war up to the 22d instant; and, fourth, I shall enclose to the memorialists a copy of my summons to the governor, to show that I had fully considered the impending hardships and distresses of the place, including those of women and children, before one gun had been fired in that direction. The intercourse between the neutral ships-of-war and the city was stopped at the last-mentioned date by Commodore Perry, with my concurrence, which I placed on the ground that that intercourse could not fail to give to the enemy *moral aid and comfort*." *Extract from Gen. Scott's despatch to the Secretary of War.*

safeguard of martial law" was required.* The Commander-in-chief is perhaps the individual least likely to be informed of the number of misdeeds perpetrated by his army. Tales told in school or in camp, though exceeding in number those ever told out of the same, do nevertheless come far short of what might with truth be told. But besides this, a general must be, from necessity, a special pleader for his forces. They are his limbs: and if, in the instance of every capitally offending one, he should "cut it off and cast it from him," he might soon be left desolate in a strange land. Or, supposing the guilty men of his army to be under sentence, according to the magnitude of their respective offences, and supposing all the remainder appointed to carry it into effect, it might be matter of speculation to-night which half of the army would be strong enough to hang or flog the other half on the morrow. We mean to say that the idea of a just infliction of punishment in an army appears to be an absurdity. An army is committed to its general to take care of—not to diminish or enfeeble it. It is not the end of discipline to produce such results. Could any government, determined on the invasion of a country, accomplish its object as well by sending thither a mob without discipline?—would it be at the trouble and expense of subjecting to discipline those who composed it, if the purpose of it was merely the regulation of their moral deportment? We trow not. They would merely receive a commission to go and do all the mischief they could on the hostile soil. Discipline, then, is merely to qualify the armed band for its avocation. That our forces fulfilled not only their vocation, but its collateral temptations presented to every passion, there is too much proof, little as is told out of camp. They have proved that war at this advanced period of the present century is like war at any period in the preceding one; and have rendered the inference too obvious that, whatever diminution of inhumanity has been effected in the modes and circumstances of warfare during recent centuries, yet that the system is scarcely susceptible of further improvement in those respects; and that until war is abolished, society in the land invaded

* General Scott's proclamation of April 11th, 1847.

will never be secure from, but will rather have assurance of, excesses such as those which pervaded the Mexican war—excesses which appear as properties inseparable from the current of war. Some illustrations of the life led by our *soldiery* (and is this designation often employed in a favorable sense?) will be presented when we hereafter proceed to consider the evils of the war. Justice requires it to be noticed at this point, that general report, and consequently public opinion, has discriminated between the conduct of the *regular* forces and that of the *volunteers*, in a manner most unfavourable to the latter.

6. As regards the Mexican deportment during the war, little allusion can be made to that of their commanding generals on the present occasion, there having been too slight a representation of it on which to found observation of any extent. To this may be added the little competency there can be to judge of the circumstances in which they were placed, and the difficulty of feeling as they did in their own country invaded. The deportment of Santa Anna with reference to the white flag sent by him to Gen. Taylor, (which has been alluded to,) is, as far as we can speak with confidence, an exception to the usual bearing of those in high command during this war, as well as to the general character of modern warfare. So likewise was his last step before abandoning the city of Mexico—setting at liberty and arming all the prisoners and convicts in that city, expressly that they might assail the Americans after the surrender, and pay no respect to the terms of capitulation. The reviewer, as well as the historian of this war, cannot hasten too soon, for his own gratification, and that of his reader, to scenes in this drama, of which the women of Mexico were the heroines.

“The angels of Buena Vista” were not long without a minstrel to tell their deeds, though in “a strange and northern tongue.” The following brief but pregnant passage contains the story that “opened his saying upon the harp:”—“A letter from Mexico states, that at the terrible fight of Buena Vista, Mexican women were seen hovering near the field of death, for the purpose of giving aid and

* Psalm xlix. verse 4.

succor to the wounded. One poor woman was surrounded by the maimed and suffering of both armies, ministering to the wants of Americans as well as Mexicans, with impartial tenderness.”*

Again, according to a writer in the *New Orleans Delta* — “During the siege of Monterey, there were constant and affecting evidences of the kindness of the Mexican women afforded to the soldiers of the American army, regulars and volunteers. When our men and officers were passing through the streets of the city, during the most exciting intervals of the battle, they would run out of their houses with baskets filled with bread and cakes, and distribute the contents among the officers and soldiers, without the reception of fee or reward for their kindness. And it can be easily imagined that these were highly acceptable donations, inasmuch as many of us at the time were very much reduced in our stock of provisions. There were also many of us during the siege, and after we had entered the city, in different yards in the place, where we fired from the tops of the houses upon the Mexican troops, stationed in the public squares or plazas. Here too our toils and lassitudes were greatly soothed by the tender assiduities of the Mexican females. There were some of them still remaining in the houses which backed upon these yards, who cheerfully tendered their services to cook for us, receiving a small amount of compensation from those who had money, and to those who were destitute of means, handing food without any reward whatever. The humanity of the Mexican women was also brightly manifested during the most intense heat of the action, in causing the wounded among the American soldiers to be removed out of the streets, where they lay weltering in their blood, into their own houses, where they carefully and tenderly dressed their wounds, and provided them with food and drink. They also evinced the most ardent devotion to such of the wounded soldiers on the American side as were taken prisoners by the Mexicans, and sent to their hospitals. They dressed their wounds, washed their clothes, and brought them fruit of different kinds, without any charge for their pains.”

* See Whittier's verses on “The Angels of Buena Vista.”

Nor does this romance of the sex end before life has been sacrificed :

"Where I was stationed," says one writing from Monterey, after its capture, to the Louisville Courier, "with our left wing in one of the forts, on the evening of the 21st, I saw a Mexican woman busily engaged in carrying bread and water to the wounded men of both armies. I saw the ministering angel raise the head of a wounded man, give him water and food, and then carefully bind up his ghastly wound with a handkerchief from her own head. After having exhausted her supplies, she went back to her house to get more bread and water for others. As she was returning on her mission of mercy, to comfort other wounded persons, I heard the report of a gun, and saw the poor innocent creature fall dead ! I think it was an accidental shot that struck her. I would not be willing to think otherwise. It made me sick at heart, and turning from the scene, I involuntarily raised my eyes towards heaven, and thought, great God ! and *is this war* ? Passing the spot the next day, I saw her body still lying there, with the bread by her side, and the broken gourd, with a few drops of water still in it—emblems of her errand. We buried her ; and while we were digging her grave, cannon balls flew around us like hail " *

Of the lower classes of Mexican women, hear an observer :

* It may be an interesting inquiry to the student of human nature, in what respect and to what extent this was characteristic of *Mexican* women in particular. Would it be characteristic of those in a northern latitude to hesitate so to act ? They would no doubt have been ready and willing, had it occurred to them. But their imagination is less suggestive to their resolution. In the days of Chivalry there appear to have been two constituting elements of the *quality* of chivalry : *courage* was one—the other consisted in the *manner* of performing an action. Now it need hardly be doubted that woman elsewhere, perhaps anywhere, would have been possessed of the requisite courage to act as woman did at Monterey, Buena Vista, and elsewhere in Mexico. Nor is it derogating from the women of Mexico to ascribe to their sex, generically, that with regard to which it was so nobly represented on those occasions. Among the natives of northern latitudes, the question as to a course of proceeding is usually one of either duty or expediency, while among Southerners it is rather one of either aspect or association. The idea of so acting in the scenes above mentioned, and the instant judgment that such was the suitable time for self exposure, (not excluding sense of *duty*, but at the same time not so exclusively implying it as elsewhere,) was a feature of *manners*, in which may be observed the influence of climate and the transmission of character from the land of Isabella, not without engraftment from the generous Saracen.

The effect of climate and of the luxuriant aspect of nature in contributing to educe the phases of character in question, can hardly be doubted. Alison has remarked, in substance, that until the history of the British *in India* shall

"I felt much interested in the numerous camp women, those devoted creatures who follow them through good and evil; and it grieved me to see them, worn down with fatigue, moving at a snail's pace, their heavy burdens almost weighing them to the earth. These women, like the Indians, are the slaves of men—a slavery they submit to under the all-powerful influence of affection. In addition to their bedding and wearing apparel, they pack upon their backs the food and the utensils to cook it in; and, worn out as they are by the toils of the day, whilst their husband or lover sleeps, they prepare his repast."

Of the Mexican forces generally, it is matter of deep regret that no report of any other conspicuous moral feature has reached us from the late seat of war, than this—that they rarely scrupled to maim and slay those who lay in their way, on the field, wounded.* It was in this manner that Colonel Clay, son of the eminent leader of opposition to this very war, was slain at Buena Vista.

Thus much has it appeared apposite to remark on the moral features that were most striking in the conduct and progress of the war.

The triumphs of genius and science in the prosecution of the war, are subjects scarcely appropriate to the purpose of this review. Apart from the little wisdom to be

be worthily written, the British character, as illustrated by romantic and disinterested exploit, will never be duly estimated. So far as this remark includes any allusion to valour, it can scarcely contemplate variations in the degree of it displayed in different climes. The writer has in view peculiar *æsthetic* advantages in the style and mode of its exhibition, to which the scenery and climate must have influentially contributed. They do not appear to have been indebted for impulse to any admirable qualities in the foe. To the latter these remarks do not apply: for to climate and scene cannot, of course, be attributed more than a tendency to impart impulse to the manifestation, and *form* of manifestation, of an *already existing* spirit, native or transplanted.

It may be observed of the people in the southern States of this Union, that they are as mediate in character as in climate, and participate in northern and southern attributes, though possessing them in a less degree than their extreme neighbours respectively. They are more northern in their tendencies than the races in corresponding latitudes, which is owing to their English origin.

* The Mexicans have not been singular in this respect among modern nations; though discarded in theory from modern warfare, it has been often practised—for example, by the Russians in the Polish war, and by the French at Waterloo. A British officer, Capt. Ommancy, (a personal friend of the present writer,) when lying on the ground dangerously wounded by a musket ball, was pierced four times by lancers. He survived for eighteen years, during which period the ball was never extracted.

associated with judgments other than professional on military operations, we take leave to observe, that whatever greatness, intellectual or physical, may be proved by military deeds to have been attained by the faculties of man—and marvellous unquestionably has been the greatness thus proved, even in the recent war—it is less a matter of congratulation to human nature than any other form of prowess. Yet who can withhold admiration at Taylor's ever-readiness to engage against whatever odds, and with whatever materials, and his effectual *coups de main*—and that attainment in military science with which Scott predestines (if one may so speak) his results, as if their occurrence was of mathematical necessity.

An ascription of a different kind may be claimed for the generals of Mexico. The productions of their pen, professional and diplomatic, afford a most classical treat. To wield "the set phrase of speech,"

"And uncouth politics to measures mould,"*

are among their refined accomplishments, and often marked with an artistic excellence of the highest order.†

The reader need not be surprised at the brevity of the observations that have been herein presented on military features in the war. But is it not remarkable how much almost every man has to say, and with confidence, respecting merit in the conduct of war, or of a battle that is of universal interest, such as Waterloo—however confessedly unable to venture an opinion upon a game of chess? It is to all appearance assumed that common sense and ordinary information are alone adequate to bear on military questions. How many give utterance to their sentiments under this previous impression! But besides an utter inutility accruing to the interests of truth in military history, from conversations on naval and military affairs, among other than military or naval men, it should be considered what moral injury to the human feelings is derived from the earnestness and the general prevalence of such conversations, considering the degree to which national rivalry

* A line from "All the Talents"—a satirical poem, published in 1807, and attributed to Canning, but not published among his poetical works.

† It is due to truth to repeat the information received since writing the above, from the best source, that these documents are generally prepared by parties holding a military *rank* merely.

and ambition are nourished by them, and the shade into which those impulses invariably throw the evils of war. Nor is that all; for where those feelings are not excited by them, the same blinding and blunting effects are cast over the sense and sensibility by stimulated conceptions, and images too chastened, of warlike deeds. A truthful apprehension of the nature and character of war is impeded by the many factitious associations that gather around the idea of the military profession, and the augmentation of force accruing to those associations from uninterrupted tradition.

To this review of the origin and conduct of the Mexican war, it was our design to have added a chapter on the evils resulting from it. But, independently of its inconvenient length, the evils to be treated of are of the same nature as those by which every war is, and must be, more or less characterized. Illustrations of them are presented in various publications—among which the reader is particularly referred to the “Peace Manual,” and the “Book of Peace,” both published by the American Peace Society, (the former being gratuitously distributed.) Much of the suffering and other evil occasioned by the war with Mexico is specifically exposed in the *Peace Advocate*.*

The manifold evils in question may be thus classified :

1. Sufferings of the soldiers, irrespectively of those necessary to the battle-field.
2. Sufferings from wounds and mutilations, not only of soldiers, but of peaceable citizens, of all ages, and of both sexes, during sieges.
3. Vindictive bloodshed on the field of battle, irrespectively of the contest for victory, and on other occasions.
4. Wanton injuries to women.
5. Military habits of rapine and plunder.
6. Domestic afflictions.
7. The more than servile humiliation of the private soldier, and his constant exposure to arbitrary ill-usage.
8. The destruction of life, or of the capacity for the enjoyment of life.

* This is a periodical, edited by the Rev. George Beckwith, Secretary of the American Peace Society, and published every second month at the office of the Society, 21 Cornhill, Boston. The subscription is \$1 00 for two years.

9. The waste of national wealth.

10. The effect of war on the interests of morality and religion in the contending nations.

Notwithstanding all this "vast variety of woe," it has been an unquestionable result of the recent war, that that cause, in the triumph of which civilization was most interested, has triumphed; the proofs of which it is not necessary to enter upon.

It has indeed been contended, as for a principle historically established, that wars have been indispensable to the advancement of civilization; decisive victories invariably (as maintained) establishing the ascendancy of better principles.* That the wars carried on in the circle of civilization have most commonly been so available, we need not question. But that there is on that account any necessity for wars, whether in the form of a compulsory instrument, or of an appointed condition, we feel bound to deny on behalf of God's pledges to suffering humanity.

Besides, what advancement in ideas appear in those tribes which are ordinarily in a state of war? If wars have advanced the world, it is only inasmuch as they have been overruled to that end by Him who "bears up the pillars" of human society, lest it should be "dissolved"† thus making "the wrath of man" to "praise" him, while "the remainder of wrath he restrains."‡ A portion of mankind is predestined to advance in civilization, whether there be wars or not, however these may retard its progress, if left to their *natural* operation. Wars, like other evils, may be commissioned with impulses favourable to certain ends. But it is, on the whole, in spite of them, that a part of the human family advances to its destined moral attainment.

And now a word or two on the subject of *just* wars:—The justice of a declaration of war cannot justify the horrible consequences, physical and moral, which are *fore-known* to be attendant on a state of war. The abstract justice of a course of conduct renders it moral *so far*. But the *law of love* has a say in every question of morality. "The moral law transfigured by love,"§ is Schiller's defi-

* See Victor Cousin—" *Introd. a l'histoire de la Philosophie.*" 1. x.—a most interesting chapter.

† Ps. lxxv. 3. ‡ Ps. lxxvi. 10.

§ "The moral imperative, transfigured by love," is (according to the trans-

nition of Christianity, little as he recognized the Christian scheme for man's renovation. If then *justice* be transfigured by charity, revenge and retaliation find no place; and if, in cases where punishment is necessary, it be not so transfigured, he who, from whatever sense of justice, inflicted it, or contributes to the infliction of it, is, morally, his own executioner to that extent. And further, "hatred is a prolonged suicide"—a maxim constructed by the same philosopher-poet*—one that is of not less appropriate application to instances of animosity between communities, than to instances between individuals.

Again, in whatever sense of right wars may originate, there is ever danger of injustice in undertaking them. Such enterprises are not subject to the judgment of any disinterested Court, but, when least unjust, are prompted almost invariably by a spirit of retaliation in the party declaring war. The absence of self-conviction with regard to the injustice of a war, does not abate responsibility for it. Moreover, not only is humanity compromised by the most just war, but such a war provides, as undeniably as any other, for the exercise of inhumanity and of every bad passion. And, by the laws of Divine Providence, criminality never escapes retribution in some form, unless arrested by moral repentance. Thus, communities, and particularly nations, have less prospect of escaping retribution, owing to the less likelihood of their repentance. For to bring a nation to repentance, even for a solitary national sin, is a work not unlike that of converting a world. And it is probable that no nation ever repented of its wars, and the bloodshed resulting from them, unless on account of ill success, or want of compensation for the sacrifice incurred in them. Nor, in those cases in which the public sentiment of a period has condemned the wars carried on and the conquests achieved in a former period, is it at all usual for atonement to be rendered to the injured nation, if there ever was a case in which it was thought of.

It may be justly complained that the conduct of our government towards Mexico has not been such as does jus-

lator, Mr. Weiss) the literal equivalent to Schiller's expression. See the introduction to his translation of Schiller's "*Æsthetic Letters, Essays, and Philosophical Letters.*"

* Philos. Let.—On Love.

tice to the character of our people. That is to say, the people having herein contradicted their social character, the government has preferred to adopt and represent this impulsive contradiction, rather than the more ordinary deportment which characterizes our people. There is not a land in which the members of society are more liberal than in this with reference to the concession of private rights and privileges ; though different sections of the country may differently strike observation as respects this feature. There is no country in which social misunderstandings are more easy of removal, through the accessible disposition of the people, and their ill-satisfaction to allow, longer than can be avoided, the existence of mortified feeling in a neighbour, from conduct by which the latter may have been even slighted—and whatever difference there may be in the position and quality of the parties.—If, for the governments of the United States and Mexico, we substitute the idea of two individuals analogously circumstanced, the course pursued by one of the parties, namely, the American, might expected to be this :—a dis-sension having arisen on a matter which none could settle for the parties but themselves, the weaker party having a morbid sense of injury, and refusing not only a restoration of the good terms previously existing, but even the intercourse requested by the stronger party for the settlement of the difficulty—the latter, if acting in accordance with the prevailing sentiments of society in this country, would simply clear himself with reference to the premises, and intimate that the continuance of the misunderstanding was not his fault, and would avoid occasion for collision ; though it need not follow that he would abandon his position, or his right, or his possession, (if he held it.) We are not, it is true, supposing any extreme case ; the matter before us does not appear to require it. Such however is the form which the principle of self-respect is most usually expected to assume in this country. That principle has, in every community, some regular forms of self exhibition, but varying as much as the regions of the earth in climate and productions. The varieties of our own climate, while symbolical of the variations of disposition in the people, are not, in *this particular*, met by an *equal* variation in the national habit of thought. There are in-

deed among us two somewhat dissonant manifestations of the principle now before us, the discriminating line between which corresponds with the broadest one of latitude in the Union, distinguishing, as it does, the idea of the North from that of the South. The *ideal* of the former is the course most consistent with *morality*; that of the latter is the course which presents the best aspect as to *manners*.* Both descriptions would concur in the course which we have assigned to the party representing this country, in relation to its sensitive neighbour. We have nothing to do with exceptions, however numerous, to the department which has the ascendant approval. Testing the controversy between the two nations by the assumed analogy—as we cannot illustrate the case by the supposition of a *land* dispute between individuals, that being one that *law* provides for, and it is otherwise with our present hypothesis—there is no difficulty in marking out the course of conduct towards Mexico which would have most correctly represented the manners and sentiments prevalent throughout this country. The national duty therefore at the period of the crisis, viewed in the light of the foregoing test, was opposed to the movement beyond the station at Corpus Christi. At the same time it might with propriety have been not only notified to Mexico what boundary we claimed, but further intimated that, for whatever length of time our arms might lie peaceably on that spot, our claim would not be thereby abridged. Had an appeal been made to the deliberation of our people, on the question between this course and that which was pursued, their instincts and habits of thought would most probably have suppressed those casual impulses which might cause a hesitation with regard to the former. We have not yet supposed any extreme case. Such a one could only have occurred, in the event of Mexico endeavouring to drive our army beyond the Nueces, or to prevent the legitimate effects of our jurisdiction in the territories we were actually occupying. We cannot include among *these* effects the put-

* It is not assumed that the standard of either is the best. But such are the ideas which enter into and characterize the life of each respectively. Similar discriminations appear in some "Philosophical Letters on North and South," addressed to Mr. G. P. Marsh, by "a Northern man with Southern citizenship."

ting down of the Mexican custom-house at Brazos Santiago, the suddenness of which *notice to quit* was itself inconsistent with the idea of *preserving the peace*, which if not a definition of *jurisdiction*, is at least its primary end. What ought to have been our deportment in the event of what we have admitted as an extreme case, is subject to the rule of conduct implied by a prohibition of war, offensive or defensive. And an observance of this principle involves neither the retreat nor the unresisting surrender of the army of Corpus Christi, but the non-existence of such a band there. And if called upon to show the practical application of the theory, in case a Mexican army invaded that part of the country, we have only to reply—first, that, if there was unlikelihood of it while we had so small a force there, that unlikelihood is increased in the supposed absence of all our forces;—and secondly, the *trial* of the pacific principle in its unqualified extent is all that we ask, and the least that we accept, in order to sustain the theory. If in some suitable case, such as the recent one between this country and Mexico, the two parties would each offer to concede the point to the other, or if one of the parties, less deficient in generosity than the other, were so to act, it might introduce a new epoch in international manners, and relieve politicians of that nice responsibility and difficulty from which they at present suffer whenever the national “honour” is the only material consideration. Whatever difficulty there might be in the way of introducing this policy in cases where the territory in dispute is of value (in which event arbitration is the most apposite course) it would say little for the “honour” of human nature, if the same difficulties were permitted to have place in cases where, not the territory, but national honour, or little besides that, is involved. It is not presumed that the people of the United States would, in the present state of human sentiments, be prepared for such a mode of concession, if only proposed while a matter is in controversy, and especially if proposed to be made to a stronger power than Mexico; in which cases they would consider the motive liable to questionable construction by the opposite party and by the world. But had the President proposed it to the country as related to a consideration of the mortified state of Mexican feeling, and accom-

panied with the understanding that the concession was to be conditional on the return of Mexico to an amicable deportment towards this country, and that, until then, any attempt by her to exercise jurisdiction in the territory proposed to be conceded would be resisted by this nation, there is little doubt that the country would have assented. Texas would probably have been inclined to object, in her temptation to exult over Mexico; but in her gratitude for the act of annexation, she would scarcely have opposed the general sense of the American nation, had it been expressed as we have contemplated. But independently of the view that might be taken by Texas, although our government considered it as binding on the national course, yet since the boundary of Texas was unsettled, and was not an implied condition of annexation, it was not incumbent on the government to treat the matter as one of Texan interest.* There is, it is acknowledged, a *literal* incongruity between the circumstances of the Mexican question, as it actually was, and the form assumed for it in the above argument. That is, we have treated it as an implied question of boundary between ourselves and Mexico on the *west* side of Texas; whereas Mexico claiming to the Sabine, that is, the whole of Texas, would treat upon no question as to the western frontier of Texas. But had the government of this country acted in the mode we have imagined, it can hardly be surmised that Mexico would have persisted in the untenable attitude of a threatening re-conqueror of Texas, now united with this country, after being forced to abandon that State while it was isolated and single-handed. Besides, on the holding out of such an amicable arrangement by this country, the sentiment and influence of all nations would have been added to the scale in which would have been thus laid the interests of peace—nor confined to locality, inasmuch as the contemplated event would have obtained the force of precedent. And although the nations are yet far behind the point they claim to have attained in humanity, yet it would be doing them injustice to doubt that they would have made the best use in their power of so favorable an opportunity

*If so, then any frontier State in the Union might consider the Federal compact violated, when a new boundary is run, as between Maine and Canada.

for the improvement of the epoch, if not the constitution of a new one.

In conclusion, it may be remarked, that the war, which we have been engaged in reviewing, was, previously to a discovery of the gold region, calculated to strike the future historian as involving little more than a continental importance. A *world-historical* character now belongs to it; particularly if, as appears in the highest degree probable, the discovery of the gold region is a material event in the scheme of Divine Providence for the renovation of the East—inclusive of the restoration of the Jews to their own land.—Through the geographical circumstance in question, civilization and the gospel will be diffused over the Western side of this continent; and increasing intercourse with the Asiatic nations will bring these in a vast degree under those influences. If this were all that is in prospect, the era in which the first impulse has been given to such destinies, is of the greatest magnitude that history can ascribe to it. Such is the *indirect* contribution to apparent prospects, by the solitary event under notice. And this very bearing suggests, with no slight force, the *direct* manner in which the event may subserve the purposes of the Most High. Doubtless he has laid that golden region under tribute from the beginning, either to send forth the ships—the ships charged to bring his people to the haven where they would be, or to be an Ophir to Jerusalem restored, if it was not the Ophir of King Solomon's day. Not a little remarkable is it, that this region has been veiled from the eye of avarice, until the period when it would be tributary to the divine counsels, and morally useful to the world. Could the vain searchers for El Dorado in former times, have foreseen the result and its *rationale*, they had been gross indeed, had they not acquiesced in this economy, and “vindicated the ways of God to men.”

To carry speculation on the result somewhat further;—That England will be possessor of the present Asiatic and principal African dependencies of Turkey—an event natural in respect to her Eastern interests, and in view of her moral influence in those regions—may be confidently anticipated. Indeed, as we have elsewhere remarked, she “is expected in the East.” Under such circumstances, should they occur, the whole of Asia (excepting Tartary) will be under the influences of the Anglo-Saxon, to an ex-

tent scarcely admitting of limitation. The wall of obdurate exclusiveness by which China has not only shut out whatever is not assimilated to herself, but concealed what it *may* be the interest of humanity to discover, and the intention of prophecies to declare, will be then shattered to its foundation by the moral influences both from the East and from the West. To which ever sea she turns, even now, the Anglo-Saxon is her nearest neighbour. The ships that bear exotic wealth to her, and are messengers to the ends of the earth, are *his*. From no other tutor will she derive her new civilization, if she is to have one. By no other powers will she be politically influenced, than the two branches of this chosen race. May God grant that, aside from their prospective co-operation for the realization of His written will, the peculiarity of their position may not engender opposite ends, jealousy and strife.

ON THE MEANS OF PREVENTING WAR.

An Essay on some of the means by which the evil of war may be prevented, may be a not inappropriate supplement to the preceding review. The following enumeration of means contributive to that end, may perhaps cover the whole ground :

1. A diffusion of the moral power of Christianity.
2. A direction of the special attention of society to the effects of war, and to the principles of peace.
3. Peace Societies and Conventions.
4. A Congress of nations.
5. Arbitration—both as an habitual resort, and as the subject of special treaties.
6. The disarmament of nations.
7. Unfettered commerce.

It is only to a few of these that we at present address remark ; after which the subject of *civil* war shall receive attention.

I. On the subject of Peace Societies, it is but necessary to exhibit their efficiency. Hear the plea of the American Peace Society, in the following extracts from one of its publications :*

* A tract entitled, " Shall I give to the cause of Peace ?"

"The general tone of feeling on this subject in the East and North, was once as bad as it now is at the West; and the change of public opinion which has actually abolished militia drills in some of the New England States, and in all reduced it well nigh to a nullity, may be traced mainly to the efforts made by the friends of peace *at a very small expense*. During its first ten years here, this cause received less than \$500 a year, for the next ten years little more than \$1,000 a year, and from its origin in 1815 to the present hour, hardly \$50,000 in all. With an addition of \$10,000 a year for the last ten years, or \$5,000 a year for twenty years past, we might have diffused over the rising West, over the whole country, such pacific sentiments as would, under God, have saved us not only from this crusade against Mexico, but from danger of war with any other nation.

"Now, in what way could five or ten thousand dollars a year, \$100,000 in all, have been spent to better purpose? We disparage no form of charity to the poor or the suffering, no enterprise of Christian benevolence at home or abroad; but tell us where such a sum *has* done, or is likely to do, a tenth part of the good that would have been secured by the prevention of this single war. The cause of foreign missions is supported at an annual cost to Christendom of some \$2,500,000; but can all the missionaries now among the heathen do good enough in one year, or twenty years, to counterbalance the manifold evils of this war? Nine or ten millions are annually expended in our country to support public worship; and how many years must all our ministers and churches, of every name, with their varied instrumentalities, labor to repair in full the injury done by this brief, distant war, to the spiritual interests of our own people alone? Nor, besides the boundless sweep of its social, political and moral evils, is even its waste of property, though the least of all its calamities, to be entirely overlooked, especially in an argument touching money. War generally wastes twice as much as it costs; but hardly any body expects this war, even if stopped in a month, to cost ourselves alone less than \$150,000,000 in the end, one-third of which must come from professed Christians, the church-members of our land. Here is the economy that refused aid to the cause of peace;—rather than give five or ten thousand dollars a year to prevent all wars, we sacrifice in a single war of two years twenty thousand times that sum, and one-third of it all from the pockets of the church. * * * * *

"Prevention is our grand aim, also our only hope; and with adequate means, we cannot doubt the possibility or the moral certainty of saving our country henceforth from all war. Had this

cause received for the first ten years here ten thousand dollars a year instead of four or five hundred, and for the last twenty years thirty thousand a year in place of two or three, it might by this time have so far christianized public sentiment through the nation, as well nigh to insure us against war through all coming time. * * * * *

"In 1837-8 we were in most imminent danger of a war with Mexico; and Ex-President Adams, in a published letter, expressly attributed our escape to the timely and efficient efforts made by peace societies. We were exposed in the course of a few years to war with England in three instances,—the Canadian troubles, the North-eastern boundary, and the Oregon dispute; and, had public opinion in the two countries been what it was fifty or even thirty years before, no skill of diplomacy could have prevented a conflict. The general peace of Europe, after twenty-two years of war that are supposed to have sacrificed eight or ten million lives and some forty thousand million dollars in all, has been preserved nearly thirty-three years, ever since, and only since, the commencement of efforts in this cause. True, other influences have, as in all kindred enterprises, conspired in producing these results; but they are as fairly attributable under God to the cause of peace as the spread of Christianity is to the missionary cause, or the triumphs of temperance to that cause. No enterprise, to our knowledge, has ever accomplished more, if as much, with so small an amount of means; for all Christendom has thus far given it not more than \$150,000, an average of only four or five thousand dollars a year."

Though it is a sudden transition from the sphere of figures, somewhat into that of romance, we cannot refrain from presenting the idea, that a body of peacemakers from different countries, and especially from the two recently at war on this continent, might with some effect have stood in the breach, at the commencement of the war. At the peril of their lives, if necessary (though the adventure would probably not have involved great peril) they might have shewn what it is to be soldiers of peace, whose business it is to die, if required as a testimony, equally as the soldiers of any other cause. Had this been fanaticism, then, for once, there had been good in fanaticism.

The enterprise of a world-police (so to speak) however few, armed with the olive-branch alone, to arrest the collision of two armies, or to perish between them, would

never have been lost on mankind, particularly the nations through whose encounter they were rendered martyrs. Imagine these nations to behold a deputed number of their own citizens and their foes united, prostrated by the deadly weapons they themselves had sent to that very field—slain while taking sweet counsel together, and “in their death not divided”^{*} illustrating the unity that should have prevailed, at any sacrifice, between their respective nations! It would have been found that those who had thus fallen in the midst of the battle, were mighty beyond those who had carried arms thither. Their blood, like that of other martyrs, would have watered the seed sown by them. Their testimony would have been borne over the hills, and planted on the heights, more swiftly than the standards of the most rapid conqueror. The demands of the case, however, imply no such sacrifice. Their mission could scarcely be a failure, even if, like other sons of light, of not a more sublime distinction,

“From each band with speed retired,
Where erst was thickest fight, the angelic throng,
And left large field, unsafe within the wind
Of such commotion.”[†]

But hope as to the result of such an adventure is not circumscribed within this alternative. Why might not the parties succeed in preventing the fray, and yet live? It were no new thing for whole tribes to change their minds in a day. How speedy was the reception of Christianity by some nations in Europe. Why then may there not be hope, that nations professing to be *already christianized*, should be converted rapidly from mutual slaughter! The day may yet arrive, when opposed armies may adopt a new method of “conquering a peace,” and, rejecting the sword, be baptized into reconciliation at the waters of strife. Imagine how such an event would shed over the scene associations, transcending in romance and in gladness any that have immortalized the banks of the Rio Grande!

But here is a scheme more accordant with the present spirit of the age:—We hear annually of world-conventions held with reference to objects to which their counsels

^{*} 2 Sam. i. 23. [†] Paradise Lost, B. vi.

are little available, and in countries where there is not the greatest need of them. But a peace-convention for the benefit of this whole continent, appears to have been left for another age. Still less thought has there been of pitching its tents at Corpus Christi, rendering that spot more than nominally an ark for the peace-bearing dove. While, for a considerable period, there has been an alienation of feeling between this country and Mexico, no efforts have been made for communication with society in Mexico on the subject of peace principles, though such might have been made with happy results.

Societies of the nature we are considering ought not to lose sight of the evil of *civil* war, as one that claims their laborious attention. In their proper place in this treatise, sentiments shall be offered on the means by which it may, to a great extent, if not altogether, be avoided. At present we humbly suggest that a mode in which the advocates of peace may greatly promote the interests of the principle, is, by the diffusion of such knowledge among the dispensers of civil government throughout the world, as will correct the views too common among them, as to the manner of preventing the outburst of popular passion. In this aspect of the duty alluded to, it renders indispensable an attention to the science of free government. This circumstance presents to collateral notice, the danger to which the interests of this cause will be liable, if its connection with the pursuit of that science be not perfectly detached from all other ends than the interests of this particular cause. If that independence be not carefully maintained, the advocacy of this cause will be liable to abuse, as a channel for instilling theories adverse to the systems of government prevailing in various countries. It is not to be expected that organizations committing such invasion, foreign to their object, would receive that confidence abroad which is essential to their usefulness. Policy is indeed far from requiring in this connection reserve as to political predilections; nor could there be an observance of such reserve consistently with the prosecution of the objects in view. Such a policy would dissociate the knowledge of good government from the sphere of usefulness, the importance of its connection with which is the point now maintained. The duty of the peace bearers with re-

ference to civil war is two-fold—on one hand to impress the popular mind with motives for abstaining from active resistance, to whatever degree right may be their's—on the other hand, to enlighten governments on the adaptation of constitutions, or of administration, to the character and wants of their respective people. Were the cause of peace as well supported as some others, the society for its promotion might have ambassadors resident or visitant in every metropolis throughout the world—selected too from the ablest public characters, with a provision adequate to the situation assigned them, and to the influence sought. Although such arrangements, if made with reference to countries of which the governments have not had previous acquaintance with the movements of the society, would be very likely to excite suspicion of untoward motives, this would not be the case, if, during the whole period *antecedent* to such arrangements, information of all the proceedings of the society are regularly forwarded to all accessible governments, whether designated as civilized or as barbarian. There can be little doubt that the sound moral system maintained by such representatives (divested of all political intrigue, or expression of party-sympathy—which would be a disqualification from such office) their knowledge of human nature in a state of political freedom or of narrow restraint, their philanthropy and feelings of universal citizenship, would procure such a degree of confidence, as would invest them, to a very considerable extent, with the attributes and privileges of universal councillors, upon national interests. It should be observed, that already some of the greatest politicians in the world are in the interest of the cause.

II. By a Congress of nations, it has been often proposed to remove the assumed necessity for wars. Without a diffused inculcation of the principles of peace, there would be little security for an obedience to the decrees of such a body; though unquestionably it would by itself diminish materially the motives and temptations to engage in war.

The only council of nations now existing, that fulfils in any degree the objects of such a Congress as is contemplated, consists of *the five powers*; and this has rather the functions of an oligarchy, created by a necessity that may have been real, or apparent, or assumed—constituted by

self-election, excluding other nations from participation, while it exercises a degree of international jurisdiction over them. Nature and special providence have made this council—if it will but apprehend its proper destiny—a suitable *nucleus* for the constitution of a Congress of nations, over an *acquiescent* area of jurisdiction. It is to be regretted that such an end was not sought anterior to the last French revolution. Had such a plan been entertained and carried into effect, there might have been now a restrictive moral force over the European nations, which, as times are, does not exist. It is not while a continent is shaken, and nations in explosion, and the atmosphere war, or rumour of war, that a permanent association of the character we plead for can be formed. When the present convulsion has subsided, the favorable opportunity will be again presented. International legislation, based on the equality of nations, being once commenced, its universal prevalence, with little exception, may be confidently hoped for. "If (says Kant,) we may indulge the anticipation, or even conception, of the established supremacy of a universally recognized law, though its perfect realization be attainable only by indefinite approximations, then the idea of perpetual peace, which shall supersede what have heretofore been called treaties of peace, but which are rather terminations of hostilities, is not chimerical, but a problem of which time promises the solution, within a period to be lessened no doubt according to the progress of the human mind."*

The subject of a Congress among the nations for the solution of their mutual difficulties has received considerable attention from individuals; likewise the requisite mode of electing, organizing, and investing such a body. It is probable that little more can be added to the suggestions already published, until an experimental application of these has been undertaken. That alone can determine the character of the theories proposed. There is enough suggested, so far as the administration of justice to nations is in point; and on other points, there is sufficient light for a *beginning*. How to enforce the decisions of such a Court—or rather how to discourage effectually a non-com-

* Kant—On perpetual peace.

pliance with them, is a department of the subject, which demands all the ability that can be brought to bear upon it; the successful exertion of which to a practical end, would most probably command all the recompense that is ever yielded to moral or political discoveries. On the supposition, for example, that the discontinuance of commerce with a refractory power, were a measure proposed to the other powers in the Congress, it were well that there should be antecedent estimates of the distresses to which individuals, or companies, or classes, would be liable in consequence of such a resolution, and the mode in which compensative channels may be opened to their enterprise, permanently or temporarily. Nor should there be an oversight of the question as to the virtual incentives to hostility obtaining through such discontinuance of commercial relations; though there would be some security against that evil, besides a hope for reclaiming the disaffected power, in the continued recognition of its privilege of representation in the Congress. These points are named as of that kind which should especially occupy those who are qualified for the investigation.

III. *Unfettered commerce* is among the most important of the peace-bearing schemes ever devised. That extensive commercial intercourse among nations is favorable to the maintenance of pacific relations, is but a truism. But that the less restricted is such intercourse, the more cemented and the less liable to violation are those relations, although it is not more questionable, yet the principle has been hardly yet (practically) invested with the recognized character of a maxim.

Sundry questions are now before the world occupying the attention of statesmen; to whom belongs the exposition of them to the popular tribunal. And on the determination of them depend, not indeed the destinies of the world, but the acceleration of such as are becoming more and more manifest. One is whether the nations ought not to be mutually dependant, rather than seek to be independent of each other. Another is whether, supposing there be sacrifices incurred by a nation, not ruinous to its essential interests, in unrestricted or but lightly burdened commerce, it is or is not preferable to incur them, with a view, partly to the greater insurance of amicable relations

with other countries, by strengthening that bond which is called *interest*—and partly to the impulse which such example communicates to other parts of the world, which are in greater need of such relations for their advancement in humanity. Another question is whether, generally speaking, a nation does really incur internal sacrifices, in the long run, by the removal of restrictions to commerce, even if its liberality be not reciprocated. It is not within our province or ability to expound these most important questions, although not without a creed respecting them, and a deep interest in them. Besides, remarks on the present topic, can, with propriety, be little other than general on the present occasion.*

With reference to commercial relations generally, and to the analogous departments of activity, to which confidence and credit are as life-blood, it might seem superfluous to enunciate the self-evident principle, that credit should be sustained as unimpaired as unavoidable misfortune will permit. But the motive for its repetition, at present, is rather to impress upon those who maintain in theory the most liberal views of international relation the high place it ought to have in their reflections, and among the objects of their intent self-application. The scrupulous maintenance of national credit abroad, in every department of business, does not admit of being passed by, when the ethical aspect of free commerce is before the

* Bastiat's work, on *Protective Policy*, translated by Mrs M'Cord, with an introduction by Professor Lieber, should be read by every one. The following remarks of Lord Palmerston are very forcible:—"Why is the earth, on which we live, divided into zones and climates? Why, I ask, do different countries yield different productions, to people experiencing similar wants? Why are they intersected with mighty rivers, the natural high-ways of nations? Why are lands, the most distant from each other, brought almost into contact by the very ocean which seems to divide them? Why, sir, it is that man may be dependent upon man. It is that the exchange of commodities may be accompanied by the extension and diffusion of knowledge—by the interchange of mutual benefits, engendering mutual kind feelings—multiplying and confirming friendly relations. It is that commerce may freely go forth, leading civilization with one hand, and peace with the other, to render mankind happier, wiser, better. Sir, this is the dispensation of providence—this is the decree of that power which created and disposes the universe; but, in the face of it, with arrogant, presumptuous folly, the dealers in restrictive duties, fly—fettering the inborn energies of man, and setting up their miserable legislation instead of the great standing laws of nature." (Speech in the British House of Commons, on the Corn Laws, Feb. 16th, 1842.)

attention. And it is important that that aspect be kept before the public mind universally ; inasmuch as every man, though not engaged in commerce as an avocation, or in agencies having affinity with it, may bear more or less, by his intersecting influences, on national or local character, with reference to those very particulars. In the transactions between governments and private persons, the principle of *repudiation* has found place, analagously as in those between individuals. And there can be no doubt that the peace of nations is, at all times, endangered, nor always in an indirect manner, by national or (what is not badly termed) *sectional* violation of faith ; besides the indirect manner in which its stability must be affected by the diminished negotiations and interests that have previously insured it.

To the greatest facilities of commercial intercourse, should be added international encouragements to a social mingling of the people of different nations ; also, *corporate* intercourse between particular classes in one country, and the corresponding classes in other countries.— Among the advantages accruing from such an approximation of nations, is the knowledge they thus acquire of one another's civilization, and of its *rationale*. This is very effectual towards the expulsion of national prejudice. He is but a child who passes judgment on nations, without an apprehension of characteristics as otherwise modified than in his own country ; and these are ill discriminated, without a capacity for referring them to other standards than his native one, supposing him to have grasped any other. It is not an unfrequent speculation, that increased intercourse between countries tends to lessen prejudice, either by making apparent a less difference in their habits, and in the mould of their sentiments, than as previously believed, or by assimilating them in a greater or less degree. The diminution of prejudice is a natural, perhaps usual effect, but not through an altered impression, which is presumed with as little reason to be a general consequence of the intercourse, as to be a means of producing the favorable result.* Whether the differ-

* Nothing can be more certain, than that the circumstance of the English language being common to Great Britain and to this country, is a cause of ill impression, in common, to people in both countries, particularly the for-

ences of the nature in question, be proved by the intercourse, to be more or less agreeable with prepossession, is not so much to the point, as an intelligence with regard to the principle of difference, or the circumstances on which the difference is based, and the elementary influences, (so far as they are not immoral,) out of which a spirit of society, other than we are accustomed to, has been formed. When read by these lights, many circumstances, inapposite to uninformed prejudice, obtain license in the court of reason, if not in that of taste. The quality of an elementary law, or organic influence, in the society of a particular region, is of course disputable. But only in relation to such laws or influences, can that society be properly estimated, or even understood.

The drift of the foregoing observations must be obvious: and it is hoped that, in their suggestive character, they are not inapplicable to use, for the promotion of good will amongst mankind.

IV. *Civil War* has been alluded to in a former part of this treatise, as creating a separate department of duty, the qualifications for which were suggested as worthy of special consideration. We propose to renew allusion to it, with a view to a presentment of certain radical causes of civil war.

Whatever be the form of government and society, supposing it to be once adapted to the happiness of a people, it is the duty of those who form the privileged orders, (if there be any such,) to regard their position as being not so much a *privilege*, as a vocation for certain ends.—When, therefore, with the progress of time, the popular intelligence has advanced, and the spirit of the age correspondingly altered, it becomes those whose position or vocation has been defined by a different state of things,

mer. For where a person finds his own language spoken, he is disappointed at the absence of uniformity, in all other respects, with his own native habits and customs. Had these two countries a different vernacular, then greater differences than there are would be looked for. Further, it is both an advantage and a disadvantage to the English language, that its spirit is intolerant of variation from a prevailing mode of speaking it. The advantage is, its greater tendency to universality in a *single dialect*. The disadvantage consists in a narrowness of sentiment, occasioned by it, which does ill justice to literary or conversational merit, when featured with variation produced by foreign birth or remote scenes.

not to be loth to yield that pre-eminence, to the extent which accords with the public spirit. It commonly happens that, when measures of reform are proposed, with a view to effect a wider distribution of privileges, or to graduate them more liberally, or to render less unequal the enjoyment of natural rights, by removing or diminishing the *causes* of excess in the inequality, the privileged orders immediately raise the cry of interference with hereditary rights. Yet these rights were not designed by Supreme Providence for their enjoyment in any other sense than every one who fulfils his duty in his proper place, can likewise realize. In what other legitimate mode can they enjoy their position? Is it in the augmented means of self-indulgence? Powers beyond those possessed by ordinary mortals, were not originally, and never legitimately—that is, consistently with natural right and moral propriety, conceded for any *such* purpose. It is simply for a useful end that any peculiar political order is created by society; and it is consequently revocable by society, whether on a conviction that it has answered its end, or that it has failed to do so. It is too commonly argued that historical proof of advantage from a certain form of constitution, or from sundry circumstances, is reason for their perpetual continuance. As well might it be argued, that the best school for the young is still the most appropriate when maturity has been attained, as that a people should not have a free constitution when qualified for the enjoyment of one. The *ideal* state of humanity, which will never be quite attained in the present dispensation of things, is one in which the most perfect self-government alone prevails; though this can never dispense with the need of delegated powers, to concentrate the popular voice, in that form which is called “government.” And this requires more or less force, according as the masses are less or more capable of taking care of themselves. In a country far advanced in civilization, there is little fear of the masses erring much in their estimate of good government, if their views are truly represented. Look at France—what is the state of public spirit throughout that country, notwithstanding the extent of insubordination? It has had a most marked expression in favor of law and order. Too many among us do the French people an in-

justice, by overlooking how sorely tried their energies have been, in resisting the tempestuous element that has threatened to submerge all the interests of man in a common burial. These severe trials, the lot of that people in the first stages of their experiment in self-government, should enlist the sympathies of mankind in a greater degree, than if there had been no volcanic elements in their political sphere, boiling evermore in an impenetrable deep. The conduct of the French *nation* is entitled to no small praise. The circumstance that so small a portion of society has produced so much turmoil, with comparative impunity, has grown out of the moderation and unavenging spirit of the people at large. Had such occurrences taken place in the United States, it is more than probable that the people would, in a mass, have risen against the insurgent community, and, as the condition of their deliverance from molestation, would have required their departure, within a given time, to some distant corner of the land, where they might have governed themselves in any way they pleased—as Mormons or as Communists—so long as they ceased to disturb the peace of the nation.—It was indeed intimated, in some of the foregoing expressions, that the depth of the disorder, in French society, is not to be probed. This unhappy circumstance renders the condition of that people, striving with a mighty effort, to fulfil their duty in the scale of nations—one that ought to be peculiarly interesting to the philanthropist, or even to those censors of mankind, whose impatience is not entirely devoid of forbearance. The state of France, at this period, is of the most vital importance, in the eyes of all who are concerned for the peace of mankind. Her internal condition requires all the attention which the statesmen and philanthropists of the world can devote to it.* It would be well if a Legislature, which volunteers

* "The Federalist," a collection of the ablest political papers ever written, should, at this time, be recommended to the study of incipient republicans. Lamartine has misapprehended the design of the *Senate*, in the constitution of the United States. In a recent speech, on the question of a second branch of the Legislature for France, he has referred to the mode of constituting our Senate, as if this were indicative of a solitary and exclusive idea in its original institution, namely: the representation of the *federal* relation. But the fact that every separate State, in the Union, has taken the precaution to divide its Legislature into two branches, of which the Senate is elec-

so much aid to the christian religion, as does that of France, would cease to exclude, as it does, consistent christians from its own body, by requiring attendance on the Sabbath, which appears to be their great day for public business, when the times are unpropitious to a devotion of it to pleasure. "The Sabbath is the sheet-anchor of religion and good morals. All experience proves it so; for France tried to do without it, and plunged at once into atheism, anarchy, and a sea of vices and crimes. It is the nurse and guardian of intelligence, and piety, and virtue, and good order, and general prosperity. It is the hinge of God's moral government over our world, and the main-spring or pivot of all the instrumentalities employed or appointed for the salvation of mankind." A nation that can dispense with the christian Sabbath, may be presumed to have made up its mind that God's moral government of the world, including of course the blessing of peace, both domestic and international, can be likewise dispensed with.†

ted for a much longer period than the Assembly, is no slight exposition of the primary intention of the *national* Senate. The adoption of this element in the constitutions of the separate States, and in their federal constitution, appears to have been founded on a conviction that the history of popular views, for a space varying from one to three or four years, is often a very different thing from a history of such views, in the same region, for six or eight years. The mode of election for the national Senate, so as to render it federal in its representation, was a grand conception. But that such was not the germ of the institution, will further appear from the following extract from the *Federalist*, No. 62, by Mr. Madison:—"Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has been proposed by the convention, is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended, by the double advantage, of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government, as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems." Had the adopted mode of constituting this branch, been otherwise than "congenial with the public opinion," undoubtedly some other of "the various modes which might have been devised," would have been adopted. So that the *institution* of the Senate was not for a federal end, although its *constitution* is made to answer that end. Moreover, the President of the Senate represents no particular State, being appointed by the people.

† Prizes have been awarded, in England, to Essays on the Sabbath, by working men. Why do not the religious societies, in *France*, make a similar call in a land where it is so much needed? As, however, statistical knowledge, on the subject, is probably small there, it might be expedient to circulate first translations of the English Essays, to familiarize some of the corresponding classes, in France, with the bearings of the subject.

Let us now turn towards England. The English are a people qualified for self-government, which, to a great extent, they already enjoy. They have always had a greater participation than other monarchists in impelling the wheels of government. This, of late years, they have done much more than ever. It has been the wise policy of the government, notwithstanding resistance from a portion of the privileged orders, to do comparative justice to the increasing claims of the people, as regards the extension of constitutional privilege, and a more comprehensive admission to the suffrage. It is in this manner that the order of things is preserved; the only occurring changes being such as harmony requires, though not to the extent required. Concessions have not usually been made when first needed, nor until they have become absolutely indispensable. But the statesmen of England have learnt to apprehend the period when such is the case. Consequently, were England to be threatened with such storms as those to which France is subject, the civilized world may exult in a belief that they would be weathered—and in a way which, to republicans in *this* country, would not appear marvellous. If the popular form of government were ever to become general, its establishment in England would be, probably, without the least bloodshed, when the hour for it might arrive. When self-government is the tendency of a people, a prematurity, in its arrival, is occasioned only by neglect to prepare them for it. The change from a monarchy to a republic, is more simple than is made to appear through the war notes that have so often ushered the transition. One definition of the change may be this—that the executive ceases to be the head of an aristocracy, and becomes the head of the people. Nor is it so much a change, in the form of government, as in the distribution of the privilege and responsibility of government. So that a government, of which the form is monarchical, may be, essentially, more republican than one of republican name.

We have intimated how unusual it has been for privileged orders to make concessions to the people, till compulsory necessity interposes. But is it right to wait for such a crisis? It is the duty of monarchs and aristocrats to “stand upon their watch, and set them upon the tow-

er, and watch to see"—not what is for their individual or corporate interest, (so regarded,) as being conservative of their monopolized privilege; but *the improvement of the people*, which it is their *mission* to further, and that, with a view to the fitness of the latter for the revocation to the general mass of that which they themselves are holding in trust for that mass. The more absolute the discretion they consider themselves to be armed with, the greater their political and moral obligation to think as for the people, and not as for themselves and their order. If they continue blind to the truth that privilege is a *commission*, they will find themselves, sooner or later, behind their age, and be no longer able to lead it. Were it matter of experience, that the orders of men in question, evinced a consciousness that such is their mission and vocation, there would be unfailing general confidence in them; and if impatience were manifested, it would be of a different kind from that by which society is alarmed.—It would be the popular aspiration of self-adaptation for the enjoyment of the privileges and the exercise of the responsibilities that await them. If there be a distrust of the popular tendency, there may be a no less counter-distrust of the professions of the privileged orders, to be engaged in seeking the national welfare *in their own*.—They must not, like the Jewish Priesthood, consider their rights invaded, because the continuance of their office, which was for the nurture of a nation, until its mind has attained a certain growth, is made a question of. Did they act on correct views of their destiny, the people would rarely fail "to esteem them very highly in love for their works sake, and to be *at peace among themselves*."* It would be injustice to the aristocracy of Great Britain (we exclude that of Ireland from this remark,) to deny their fulfilment, to a grand extent, of the ends for which they have been instituted. After their resignation, in due time, (*if* such is the appointment by providence,) of the arena which they have historically ennobled, there will be, probably, no *class* of men to whose career history will pay a more grateful tribute. They do not yet, indeed, appear to be impressed with the conditions and limits of

* 1 Thess. v. 13.

their destiny. But the theory of their appointed end, which we have ventured to propound, is an *ideal* of duty, which it must be admitted that human contemplation ordinarily refuses to embrace, and the consequence to privileged orders, by the laws both of nature and of special providence, is repeated alarm from the suppressed, but threatening spirit of mankind, until the final issue, which is thus rendered too commonly an explosion. And yet the popular spirit, now become the world-tendency, only requires, in practice, the substance of the above maxims as its counterpart, in countries where inequality of political privilege obtains. On the confluence or opposition of these impulses, it must depend whether the discontinuance of privileged orders will be an acquiescent absorption of them into that body of mankind, which they have contributed to prepare for these solutions of natural and providential dispensation—or whether it shall be the result only of national convulsions; their failure to anticipate which indicates either the immaturity or dotage of their institution. The fulfilment, by any order of men, in times past, of a purpose gradually expiring, is no argument for its perpetuation. To maintain that whatever is venerable with the hoar of centuries, ought never to be brought to a close in the world, is equivalent to denying the decree of cessation, or of change in the form of existence, to all organizations, even to contending against the dispensation of “a new heaven, and a new earth.”

Among the points comprehended in the general question of internal national peace, is an exaggerated inequality in the distribution of land in some countries. Imagine but two families in a region, typical of the two great divisions of rich and poor, and that which has first occupied claiming the whole, assigning to the other a cave or a cellar, to the limits of which it dutifully submits. Can the increase of this family be bounded by such an allotment? How is it then with what is called an over-populated country, but which only means that there is a part of the population confined to a spot which can scarcely contain it? Does not the nature of things require that the existing principles of allotment shall sooner or later undergo a change? “The earth is the Lord’s, and the fulness thereof.” If the original man was to “multiply, and re-

plenish" it, his progeny was, like himself, to have it for a residence, and each individual to have a share in its dominion, though "in the sweat of his face he should eat bread." If there be a portion of mankind for whom there is not space sufficient to enable them by the sweat of their face to eat bread, in their own land, legislation is demanded; not indeed for the spoliation of any party, but either to withdraw the obnoxious legalized principle of agricultural distribution, or, if it be prevalent without legislative enforcement, to provide against its continuance; unless the government can *immediately* convey the destitute to another soil where the sources of comfort and happiness are open to honest industry; that is, *supposing* it justifiable to present that alternative, if a remedy to the domestic evil is otherwise impracticable. No social evil is more liable than this to ultimate retribution, though in a longer run than in the case of others. And it is certain that, but for the ill provision of a vast portion of the human race, wars, both foreign and civil, and rumours of their approach, would find less encouragement on the earth—owing to a diminution of the suggested expediency for them, and of provocation or other incentive to them—owing also to the enhancement of every impulse to their avoidance, as contained in the homestead and its associations, in an increased estimate of life, time, property, and every appendage to which the idea of sacrifice can be attached.

Some notice should be taken of the form which, in confederated republics such as the United States, provocation to civil war would be most likely to assume. These States maintaining, as to their internal economy, a perfect independence of each other, it is essential to general security that no intrusion be menaced on the prerogative of any. A truism as this is abstractedly, it is nevertheless one of those political rudiments that we do well to put one another in mind of. The observance or otherwise of this constitutional tie—and the more independent internally we regard each other, the closer the bond—will be of incalculable effect on the repute of our federal system throughout the world, inasmuch as there is an exhibition hereby of the unlimited extent to which nations may be united by such a tie, without endangering the security of their internal institutions, through that difference in their modes

of thought, which is created by variety in climate, and historical or other associations. Their reciprocal independence should be such as to prevent all liability to collision, respecting local institutions and locally affected interests. They should be, in this respect, as a cluster of trees, which, though combining to produce a shade, do nevertheless, "shun each other's shade,"* when agitated, and thus avoid that entanglement and confusion which might result in disaster to them all. It is only thus that they can grow together, enjoy the same sunshine, and resist the same storms.† If a comprehensive republic, constituted on such a basis, and governed consistently with it, should not endure for ages, it would be because it is too good a system to last long, in a world which has evinced so much predilection for discord and usurpation—too great a blessing for man's perversity to allow it a long residence on the earth.

As to cases of oppression, in which the parties governed feel it a duty to make resistance, the views of an anonymous female writer are very appropriate and forcible:—"The event of a battle is always doubtful; but the opposition of steady persevering non-compliance, no victory can subdue. No man can be literally compelled to obey the commands of another. Would any ruler attempt to invade the liberties of a nation, when he was perfectly assured that all his efforts would be unavailing in producing obedience to his decree, and that, after baffling the last resources of tyranny, resolution would remain as immoveable as at the beginning of the contest? It would be like attempting with a knife to cut against the solid rock. Physical resistance is the clash of opposing lances in the tilt yard, where it is an even chance which shall first shiver the other to pieces. Hampden did more for the liberties of his country, when he stedfastly refused to submit to the illegal imposition of twenty shillings, than when he took up arms in defence of those liberties. And if all En-

* Pope.

† This illustration may be profitably amplified. Corruption in a limb of the constitution of one, must be left by the others to be cast off by its own internally prevailing life. The others are not likely to better it by an entangling interference to wrench off the morbid appendage or objectionable feature; in doing which, they may destroy their neighbor and mar themselves.

glishmen had been like Hampden, there would have been no Charles to tyrannize, no Cromwell to usurp.*

The observations submitted as above, on some of the means by which civil wars may be prevented, will render more apparent to the friends of peace, the importance of attention to the modes in which liberal principles of government may be recommended with effect, in cases where public security is involved in such questions.

The remainder of this Essay will consist of

AN APPEAL TO THE NATIONS.

Assuming that the prevailing sentiment of a nation is opposed to war, unless there be a necessity for engaging in it—which is the ground professed to be taken by all the civilized world—is it not clear that the compulsion of *honour* is neutralized by resigning the protection of that honour to a court of nations?† Is not even a prejudicial arbitration more than compensated by the avoidance of those manifold evils, for which the strongest sense of right in a dispute cannot atone to a correct moral sentiment, or to those whose lives or comfort for life, or whose interests and feelings are sacrificed. If these points be conceded, how can any nation hesitate to aim its mightiest moral efforts at procuring the concurrence of other nations, in a scheme by which national complaints may be redressed, and the motives for war superseded, if not extinguished? Independently of the result of such efforts, should a nation fail of success in her appeal to others, would that be a reasonable ground of discouragement from the pursuit of the same end by a solitary renunciation of war? What a glorious example would be the public renunciation of the principle and practice of war, by any nation of character! Who could impugn her honour, in the spirit of the present age, when only an example is required—one, involving not so much forbearance, as moral courage? There is no slight analogy between the hesitation of a nation to risk its repute for warlike courage, and that *formerly* of an in-

* From a Peace tract.

† Even the private duellist does not consider his honour to be quite safe in his own hands. He commits it to another party, in plenary confidence. Nor is the position of this party so analagous to that of an advocate, as to that of an arbitrator.

dividual to face the frown of a society in which the principles of false honour prevailed. Of the latter kind every instance of moral triumph, publicly exhibited, has aided in raising a battlement for the protection of public virtue. And why may not the example of a nation, particularly one that can shew her scars, be of like moral effect in the community of nations? What nation of any character would assail her? It might be doubted if a nation of *no* character would do so, inasmuch as all value a repute for morality when it has the name of *chivalry*—to which repute such a movement would be fatal, as in a case of aggression on an individual the reverse of combative. Further, as the prevalent idea of the expediency of increasing territorial possessions and other sources of power, would have less scope for its entertainment, if war were renounced, so every nation would be more content with its possessions. Nor would the ebullitions of jealousy be so much intruded, when one State becomes annexed to another for participation in the advantages of a better government afforded by the latter: the motives for confederation would incur less suspicion; federal relations would be established with less hesitation at home and objection abroad, when mutually beneficial: and there would be less obstruction to the formation of separate States out of large territories, where the inhabitants prefer being independent of the government to which they have been subject. If such prospects be *Utopian*, it can only be so in case mankind at large are incapable of any considerable moral elevation.

In as far as special appeal is invited by the occasion, we have more to say of course to our own United States. The idea of “manifest destiny,” which many as seriously check as others encourage, we adopt with as much enthusiasm as any—actively as to our national duty to advance the good of mankind at large—passively as to our acquisitions, which depend honorably as much on the will of others, independent of us, as on our own. This nation has but to let events take their course; and if she fulfils the claims of universal humanity upon her, without imposing self-aggrandizing movements on herself, her shadow will be sought after. If she predicts the destiny of other lands to be her possession, why precipitate the

event? "He that believeth shall not make haste."* Again, whatever nations we anticipate as our own, the more we do for their advancement, the more plastic to our influence are they rendered. And it might well operate as a motive to national effort for the universal benefaction of the human race, that we know not how much of it is one day to be our's; for it is important to our interest, that such accessions should be in the most improved condition that can be attained by them in the interval.

Let our policy be that of accomplishing our mission in the cause of human melioration; and if, after proof of this, new States are given to us, they are our reward. But we prejudice results by anticipating the providence that would have invested them with a voluntary character. Whatever ambition may be able to effect out of due course, it will hasten no acquisition that is to be real and permanent enjoyment. The supposition of it is at all events unhistorical. In all our acquisitions, the character of the circumstances through which they have come into our possession should be heedfully scrutinized. If it be matter of necessity that they shall fall to us, as it were in spite of ourselves, we cannot do better than insist, so far as we can, on the mould which the circumstances of our possession shall exhibit—their moral characteristics at least, over which we have some control. No disadvantages need then be apprehended from the enlargement of dominion. There will be little danger of unwieldiness, when the appendages are acquiescent, like naturally developed members, and not like fragments pieced on with a cement of gore, ever subject to the necessity of renewal.

In awaiting with dignified patience the developement of the grand destinies that seem to await our nation, if not prematurely interfered with, it is incumbent on the people, and not less essential to their happiness, to be guarded against the temptations held out to the inferior side of their national character, which, in every nation, is with difficulty counterbalanced by the better side of it—

* *Is.* xxviii, 16.—There is a reported expression of Rothschild, when asked why a portion of the wealth of his tribe was not appropriated to the purchase of Palestine. "Why purchase, (said he) that which is given to us to possess in due time?"

lest it be drawn out to the fulfilment of much more than they would wish to see on historical record. To wound one neighbour, and to minister balm to another, to bless one and hurt another—whether in public or in private life, in national or individual conduct—spoils the good, and atones not for the evil. Even the nation that does the most for civilization, should look to it, lest she be found to have the most blood-guiltiness in her trail.

The matter of the foregoing observations, though addressed especially to the United States, would be, it is trusted, not an unsuitable offering to the people of every nation under heaven, to whom it were more acceptably presented. Our desires should be far from circumscribed to the glories of the career of our own country. We should desire to see all nations in the enjoyment of the same triumphs, by enlisting in the same cause, which is indeed their calling—the *peaceful melioration of mankind, at whatever cost.*

Some of the principles here maintained, shall be briefly applied in a single, and we know not how remote, reference. “England is expected in the East.”* Let her go, wherever invited. Or, if determined to go at *all* events, let her leave sword and spear,† taking with her the ploughshare and the pruning hook, in which she excels even more than in the other weapons. And if that will not secure at least an equal welcome from the natives, it will be evidence sufficient, that she has misapprehended either the field of her mission, or the period for its undertaking. Where it is written—“There go the ships,” &c., it is added “These wait all upon THEE.” And one might as reasonably burden the sacred song with the contemplation of fetters for a slave coast,‡ as with that of weapons

* Warburton—*The Crescent and the Cross*. See also, in Coleridge’s *Friend*, a letter from an American officer.

† We were not a little surprised and disappointed, that Mr. Tupper, in his proposed national anthem for Liberia, should have used such expressions as,

“Come with the trumpet, the sword and the spear,
“For love of liberty brought us here.”

‡ The correspondence of Mr. Wise, the American Minister at Rio, with the British government, concerns every Englishman and American; as it exposes the extent to which American vessels, with British cargoes, are sent on expeditions to barter for slaves.

for destruction. On England's next return, in triumph, from the scenes alluded to, it is devoutly to be wished, that none of her spoils would bear, as formerly, the inscription—"Captured by the British army in Egypt."*

In connection with this reference, it might be inquired of France, whether *her* prospects of being made at home in the East, have been advanced by the nature of the arms she sent across the Mediterranean—*conceding* the propriety of the mission, and the appropriate period for the enterprise. Has she not raised a barrier of steel to her own progress? Does any one doubt that William Penn would have made his way thither, in less time and with less sacrifice, than it will cost *her*, should the least success attend her?

To return to this country—the associations with its apparent destiny—possessed as it is by a branch of the Anglo-Saxon race, are such as to render important an allusion to circumstances that might threaten its progress with a drag. Notwithstanding the vast accessions to its

* This is all the history that is appended to that celebrated *antique*, the Rosetta Stone, in the British museum. From the circumstance that the presents there deposited, are commonly acknowledged, one might, in the absence of better information, suppose that this had not been presented, as it was by the Turkish government, but had been, without scruple, taken from the land of an ally, after being captured from the foe of the latter. It is mentioned, however, in Bonomi and Arnudell's *Gal. Antiq. Brit. Mus.* that "by the fortune of war, and the presentation of the Turks (it) came into the possession of the British government." Also, Long (*Egypt. Antiq.*) refers the British claim to Article 16 of the Convention of Alexandria.—The extent to which *morale* is here involved, is simply this—that the military aspect of the transaction, is considered as solely entitled to consideration, to the exclusion of the legitimate mode in which the treasure was acquired, and the courtesy of the former proprietors—as if this was mere form, and as if, in the *vi et armis*, all was contained that could be presumed to interest the reader. Previously to the information imparted by the above named authors, the satisfaction of the present writer, as to the unexceptionable character of the circumstances of possession in question, could only consist of an *inference* from the scrupulous deportment of the British government, with reference to points of this kind, of which the investigation by the committee on the Elgin Marbles, is a strong proof. The circumstance which is the subject of this note, though a small matter in itself, is in keeping with that disposition in the English, often noticed by foreigners, as striking at first sight, and in little congruity with their great pre-eminence in the arts of peace—to give the greatest prominence to naval and military distinction, as proved by the comparatively fewer memorials "erected at the public expense" to those who have advanced their country in other departments.

population from other countries, the Anglo-Saxon is far more than the merely prevailing element among those of which the nation is composed ; for it assimilates and nationalizes the others. Considering the high calling of the race, the admixture of others with it, to the present extent, on this continent, is not unlike an election of them by providential favor to engraftment with it. An abuse of this privilege is occasionally threatened by portions of the grafted population having designs extraneous to the country and its interests, and at variance with its historical spirit. If it be not in the power of the rest to deter them from intervention with the political difficulties in their native land, which they are presumed by their present citizenship to have resigned a personal connection with, it is at all events not the interest, any more than it is consistent with the political and moral principles of the rest, to be drawn in any degree into a compromise of their national stand-point and their whole foreign policy, for the gratification of that party. This allusion is obviously to the efforts occasionally made for interesting the people of this country in the affairs of Ireland, to a far greater degree than they were ever invited to interest themselves in those of France. Yet the French element, in our population, is unquestionably more involved in our commercial and other international ties. It is, perhaps, the less participation of the Irish class in those interests, that renders their proceedings thus independent of the consideration of them. It is natural for a man to sympathize with his native land, particularly if he is well acquainted with the history of its trials.* But it is no indication of his regard for the land he has adopted, if

* Aside from the merits of the controversy, between Ireland and England, the great difference in temperament between the people of the two nations—exceeding as it does even the difference that might have been looked for had they been distant in geographical latitude—would sufficiently account for the incessant broils they have, while subject to the same legislation ; even as individuals that vary greatly in that respect, rarely comprehend each other's impulses, or do one another justice, and cannot be reconciled to the same social restrictions. The establishment of their separate sovereignty, but in federal union, is all that can keep them in domestic peace. Thus related, it would matter little how their modes of thought differed, so long as they would let one another alone. Such an order of things does not interfere with the question as to the character of the federal executive office, whether it be monarchical or otherwise.

he proposes a compromise of its interests and principles to the passions he has brought with him, though they may be enlisted in a good cause. Even another and very different description of persons, the advocates of universal peace, would not be warranted in the promotion of that cause, did it tend to throw back, in their own country, the interests of humanity. Inasmuch as the Irish question has put forth claims to American *sympathy*, it is but just to raise a collateral question of *reason*, that nullifies its pretensions. It ought not to be lost sight of, that there is admixed with this question the idea of an *anti-Saxon* movement. The drift of this allusion is not to the circumstance of an Anglo-Saxon country, (England,) being the object of this movement, as if such a circumstance should affect the bearing of a just and unobtrusive sympathy; far from it. But where the sympathy is called upon to assume a different character, to subject itself to indefinite demand upon its activity, it is no appeal to prejudice, although a caution against dangerous prepossession, to suggest the tendencies, immediate or remote, of the sympathy invoked. The tendency of the whole scheme of excitement, is to animate the impulses of one-half of the Anglo Saxon race, now in the world, into a not inactive interest in the domestic insecurity of the other. But the prospects of the entire race, and of the world likewise, can ill afford that loss in progress, which may result from any abatement of the energies of either branch; and if those of the one are of diminished power or compass, through the opposition of forces impelled by the other, those of the latter are ill spent, to say the very least. It is not, indeed, in any *combination*, but in the observance of the most perfect political independence of one another, that the mission of the two branches of this race will be best fulfilled. But that very independence is molested and tampered with, if the parties who are forming projects of intrusion upon the internal peace of the one, have a disproportionate share of moral influence conceded to them in the other. The naturalized parties alluded to, are of course unaware how prejudicial are the movements under objection, to their own national interests as *Americans*, which is all that they have any right to call themselves.

A word or two may be added on the advantage, negative as it is, of the invidious considerations which have attended the intercourse of England and the United States—circumstances not immaterial in qualifying the good understanding between these two nations. Whether we may or may not assume that they have outgrown the likelihood of war with one another, or that the repugnance of national sentiment, in both countries, to such an event, is a more than ordinary security against its occurrence; the usefulness of their mutual petty feelings to the interests of the world, consists in the prevention of certain *enteintes* which might otherwise be anticipated from their affinity. A comparison of this observation, with some that have gone before, if superficially regarded, may seem to create a paradox. Its reference is rather to the prematurity of such *enteintes*—that is, their existence, before the tone of international morality shall have become such as to preclude the idea of their combination to molest the independence of other nations. However they might pride themselves on their aversion to war, and however influenced by a sincere desire to undertake a joint mission to advance the civilization of the world in the most pacific modes, it is too probable that self-gratification would be the predominant impulse. At all events it is a mission with which they can hardly be yet entrusted. Until their governments shall abandon, on principle, the prevailing doctrines on the subject of war, they will be scarcely fit, either of them, for the enjoyment of power, the double of that which already each of them possesses. There is no doubt as to their extending civilization, under such circumstances, with a vastly augmented influence. But whether they would undertake it in any other mode than that which has been hitherto usual among nations, may well be questioned. There can be no danger of misapprehension of the allusion to circumstances invidious in their nature; inasmuch as the remark contains nothing commendatory or congratulatory as touching those circumstances, but simply an explanation of their providential use. There is, indeed, an obvious limit to the utility, or even harmlessness, of an invidious countenance, in either nation, towards the other. There

has been much complaint, in this country, of English travellers traducing it—a practice which cannot gain upon the better feelings of any people. True it is that various States, in the Union, do sometimes speak as prejudicially of *one another* as foreigners ever speak of the entire country; for differences in *latitude* affect the modifications of taste in a much greater degree than those of *longitude*—other circumstances being equal. But variance in tastes, and even jealousies, between different sections of the same country, are not intolerable evils, so long as there is room for them on the same platform.—But a national practice of disparaging another country, is very unfavorable to pacific prospects, however indirect and remote may be the effects from it. Those who conduct the press of a country, since they are always regarded, in other countries, as representing its spirit, should never fail to bear this in mind, characterized, as the press too often is, with a reckless impolicy.*

There would be more security for a cloudless prospect, had England no possessions on this side of the Atlantic. These, all together, are not now worth, to her, the cost of a war (if ever there should be one) to protect them, even were the greatest success to attend her arms. The northern colonies have outgrown their state of pupilage, and can only, in a state of independence, make those returns to the mother country, on account of which their existence is of any consideration to her. As regards the British West Indies, the career of the Anglo-Saxon, *on his own account*, is there manifestly closed. A new crisis in the history of his mission to the African might be hastened, and appears to be the only substitute for the stagnation that now fills every department of life in those

* There was an occasion, about the year 1842, on which the British and French nations were much incensed against each other. Sir Robert Peel, then prime Minister, remarked in Parliament, on the grand moral spectacle, then presented to the world, in which, while the press in both countries was doing its best to precipitate war, the two illustrious chieftains, then contemporaries in political ascendancy, as formerly they had been in military command, (Wellington and Soult,) were using their utmost efforts, each to conciliate the opposite country, and to pacify his own. The observations (which it would have been preferable to quote literally, were they accessible to more than imperfect recollection,) were circulated in several French and American journals.

colonies.* Their independence, or *quasi* independence, under the administration of a Colonization or African society, on one or both sides of the Atlantic, might be guarantied by all nations. Their special protection might be provided for by treaty, including provisions expressly intended for observance in time of war. In the devotion of those scenes to a philanthropic experiment, there would be no scope for international jealousy ; at the same time, it is their legitimate destiny. It will be a day of the highest interest to humanity, and the commencement of an important era, in the reign of providence, when the last remains of possibly attractive grounds for collision are removed, between powers whose associate mission is so strongly apparent.

Nor has yet been mentioned that which may be surmised as to the effect of temptations or provocations offered to the weak side of the American character.—Should there be ever again a collision between this nation and one which, in power, may compare with it, let the world, and still more, let ourselves, be prepared for the dire consequences ! It is to be apprehended that such a martial spirit would take hold of our people, as would be long before it could subside. An immense portion of our population, conscious of the facilities for their adaptation, on very short summons, to the most arduous enterprises, would (we dread the thought !) sacrifice probably every consideration to that of military glory. The profession of arms can too easily become every man's profession here, to allow a hope of the early termination of a war, in which the utmost strength and spirit of the nation were drawn out. With anything rather than "flattering unction," should we feel imbued, at the contemplation of such a state of things ! Besides that a military republic ever ends in despotism—how vitally, if not fatally, would all the arts of peace, the cultivation of every virtue, the sources of domestic and social enjoyment, and every other blessing, be then affected, even in the soil where they have taken root deeply, and which is the home of every element of happiness !

* The present proprietary class, who are ready to abandon at least the island of Jamaica, would be as glad to receive, as they would be (and are even now) entitled to, compensation on yielding up their *lands*.

And now a word to Mexico. Let her sons "talk no more so exceeding proudly,"* as to military pretensions; but let them, influenced by generous woman, and by sunny climes, aspire to become the *Troubadours* of peace. This is the only chance now remaining to them for national distinction. To the women of Mexico, there remains but this step to crown the character that awaits them in history, namely, to cherish this association, and to foster it in their countrymen. An exertion of such influence would be the best commentary on woman's mission, that the world has seen—always excepting that presented by the "company of women,"† who followed to his cross the Prince of Peace. If in your sphere, women of Mexico, you are "to time, as stars to night,"‡ your course is determined on, and the decree is gone forth, that your mission shall not fail!

In conclusion;—We have set before mankind no Utopian prospects as the promised reward for abjuring war—none other than they can substantiate, if they will but commence the project of attaining them. Our ardent hope is that a republic will be the first to adopt measures avowedly for that end, and thus evince to the world how a self-governing people can anticipate others in the race of civilization. But rather than that it should be delayed, let the glory of so doing be yielded to the most absolute sovereign. Sooner, indeed, than behold this movement retarded, lest civilization should lose the credit of it, gladly should we receive the lesson from the most unenlightened tribe that a missionary ray ever penetrated.¶ There

* 1 Sam. i. 3. † Luke, xxiii. 27. ‡ Pollok.

¶ The Rev. James Long, Missionary of the Church of England in Calcutta, bears this testimony;—"I have seen the benefits conferred by the Peace Society, both at home and abroad; and I regard it as eminently calculated to promote the glory of God, and the good of men. I rejoice to have an opportunity of co-operating, as a clergyman of the English Church, in the designs of so noble and excellent a Society. I have labored among the Hindoos for eight years, a large number of whom have renounced idolatry, and are fully acquainted with English literature; but *their greatest objection to the reception of Christianity is the warlike spirit manifested by those who profess it.* They read the history of England, and then tell us, "You say that Jesus Christ taught his disciples to love their enemies; but we find that you English Christians have been engaged for hundreds of years in killing the French, and other nations! Your history abounds with scenes of blood, which are approved of by your best and even your religious writers, while your clergy offer thanks to God, as if he were a God of blood, like our Kale, when you

is hope for the world, both civilized and barbarian. Notwithstanding the backwardness of each, an estimate of universal peace is abroad, adequate to encourage a very great confidence in the effect of a *single national example* of the nature we plead for—the abjuration of war. Gratefully, as we believe, would the tidings of such an event fall on the ear of a vast portion of mankind, in all lands. Whether we set or follow the example, the advantage to our representatives, everywhere, commercial, political and religious, when able to tell it abroad that no wars are waged by their countrymen, would surpass the most glowing descriptions of national success in any past enterprises; and the moral effect would be but feebly symbolized by the transmutation of steel into gold. Glorious things await such a nation in the prospective history of the human race. If internal peace is maintained by her consistently with her external banner, both the wise and the rich of the earth will, in greater and greater numbers, “bring their glory and honour into her.”* Her converse with other nations will dispense the flowers of goodwill “beside all waters”†—a circling tie more soft, yet not less strong, than that “golden chain” in which “generous commerce binds the nations.”‡ The picturesque distributions of society by Providence, have certainly no less claim than the disposition of the natural world, to be accounted as the pattern of a more excellent economy. For eminence in eternal fame will be the endless reflection of moral light from the associated past and present. And as the works of individuals accompany them from the present stage of being, yea, have recorded themselves forever, it cannot be otherwise with nations. Their past is inextinguishable. A memorial is engraven forever of the part which they have had in the elevation or depression of the human race. “Rahab and Babylon, Philistia, and Tyre;

gain a battle.” They say, moreover, that since England put her foot in India, a century ago, there has been nothing but war; and I am sorry to say I cannot contradict them. This objection to the reception of Christianity is the most difficult to answer of any I have to deal with. I have for twelve years been advocating the principles of this Society; and as long as I have breath and strength, I will continue to advocate them.”

* Rev. xxii, 24.

† Isaiah, xxxii, 20.

; “———Generous commerce binds

The round of nations in her golden chain.”—*Thompson.*

with Ethiopia"—are *they* not to be "made mention of?" Let us not doubt, then, of this sequel to our country's history, whether to its glory or to its shame. Nor let us cease to contemplate that a nation which will cultivate in itself a type of the City of Peace, it will be a future delight to call our own in the days of a renovated world; for it will be commemorated that "this and that man was born in her!"*

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES.

A.—ON THE TERM CHIVALRY.

The modern use that is made of this term, particularly in some parts of this country, is more injurious to the interests of morality than is commonly suspected. Its original associations are military, and it should be properly confined to that sphere. In its transferred application to social qualities, it implies primarily the performance of any thing in the approved manner of a knight of the middle ages. Consequently, he that aims at a repute for chivalry, has but to affect the knight in that which he undertakes, whether it be a quarrel, or a question of deportment towards the fair sex, or a money-matter—with reference to which last-named description, there is an impression abroad that the clergy have not less to complain of from the laity of the chivalrous soil than from any other. The evil arising from the vulgar use of the term, grows out of its indefinite character, combined with its prepossessing associations. To that conduct which is expected from any gentleman, it often assigns a factitious credit; while that which is unseemly it palliates, whenever an association of it with knighthood can be conjured up. In nine out of ten cases in which it is made use of, the object is *ad captandum*—to throw a gloss over that which may or may not be proper. If *sacrifices* are in question, those required by the spirit of Christianity look down on those of the best chivalry. If *heroism* is intended to be expressed, that term needs no substitute, and at all events its place is not as well supplied by the term *chivalry*. In fact, every department of rectitude requires to be protected from the risk of being levelled, (through the application of this term to it) to that conduct which requires gloss to recommend it. Propriety,

* Ps. lxxxvii, 5.

morality, compassion, courage, are terms adequate to express the ideas to which they are respectively assigned; and how are any of these qualities improved by characterizing them as chivalrous? In so far as they are of *Christian* complexion, they lose by such designation; as the Christian light in which they appear implies a sacrifice to *principle*; whereas, chivalry, when it implies sacrifice, refers it rather to glory, appearances, passion, will-worship, self-will—one or more of these. Any little deed of compassion may be invested with the colour of chivalry, if attended with “a set phrase.” For *designative* force, any thing that chivalry is ever intended to signify, can be more definitely, and therefore more appropriately, expressed. To say that a person is chivalrous, conveys now-adays but a vague idea of his character, if any at all. Where a stranger, however, in some parts of this country, is informed, for his edification, that the inhabitants *there* are a chivalrous people (while he may have been previously under an impression that the people of the United States *generally* had, as much as any other, the best features ever suggested by the expression) the *real* idea that most commonly suggests its use on such occasions, is, that the people in those parts are generous, or (perhaps no more than) *gentlemanly*; though sometimes it indicates (without the intention of implying) that they have not a little to say in demonstration of a tendency to cultivate analogies to the deportment of the knights we read of in history and in fable. Be the affectation ever so innocent in itself—be the imitation of knights ever so wise or foolish—the gloss is the same; and true honour is thus often placed on a level with the pretensions of conceit. As the term under stricture has been occasionally used in this review, the author owes it to himself to observe that, when he has employed it, it has been in a military application.

The highest principle of chivalry, if the term be used in a moral sense, would be the same that characterizes *true nobility*—which, in the estimation of Michelet,* is *self-sacrifice*, for good ends. But we should learn of Him† whose self-sacrifice was the greatest that can be conceived. Apart, however, from a regard to the christianized aspect of the principle, it is one of which Christians, so called, are indebted to the infidel philosopher for reminding them, in an age in which a habit of non-committal is the highest virtue. By their religious profession they are already committed, beyond the power to repudiate it, to self-sacrifice for the good of man, and for the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom—which includes the studied inter-

* People, ch. 3 † Mat xi, 29.

ests of all the principles of peace at some personal hazard. The proclamation of "peace on earth,"* both as a *principle* and as a *promise*, and the avowal, too, of an intention "not to send peace but a sword"†—in the sense of sufferings incurred, both in moral conflicts with the elements adverse to that principle, and for the realization of that promise—are testimonies not inconsistent, though on opposite sides of the truth which they together maintain. The difficulties predicted are but negative *conditions* of the providence that advances the principles for which the self-sacrificer labours. "Good-will towards men" is the light that kindles the voluntary self-sacrifice, which, the more it burns, though with the acutest feeling, is more secure from being consumed. Such is Christian heroism—such is true Christianity militant—such the most elevated manifestation of what might be called moral chivalry.

B.—ON REPUDIATION.

The repudiation of Mississippi—its occurrence being based on circumstances represented to the author by an ex-Governor of that State, who was a prominent repudiator—was an exhibition of political fanaticism by a party that gained the ascendancy in the State. Another party, when in power, obtained a vote of the legislature in favor of their proposal to raise a certain sum of money, under certain circumstances. An article of the State constitution, it appears, prohibited the measure.‡ The minority gave public warning that the State would therefore not be bound by the act, and that, though the vote might succeed, yet if *they* should come into power, they could never pay it as a State debt. This party gained the ascendancy at a subsequent election, on the basis of this very principle, and came into power pledged to sustain it. They admit that the money raised ought to be paid to the parties who lent it—but by those who raised it, not by the State of Mississippi, against whose authority (they assert) the transaction took place; while

* Luke, ii, 14. † Matthew, x, 34.

‡ Without knowing precisely the objection in point, we cite from an "Abstract of the Constitution of Mississippi," in the American Almanac (1848, p. 287,) the following:—"No State loan can be raised, unless the bill be passed by a majority of each house, be published three months before the next election, and be confirmed by a majority of each house at the next legislature."

the opposite party, who raised the money, have always been anxious for the payment. It was not, then, an intrinsic dishonour that actuated the repudiating party, but the exaggeration of party feeling into an uncompromising fanaticism; and fanaticism is never devoid of immorality, inasmuch as it sacrifices any thing and every thing to the principle (be it a good or a bad one) which it has espoused. It can be hardly believed that the people of Mississippi expected their treasury to be gainer by their course. They should rather be considered as having sacrificed pecuniary, as well as every other consideration, good, bad, and indifferent, to their party-position. But there are anomalies in the matter which are not unworthy of fanaticism. They never summoned to trial the parties who had thus trifled with the constitution, and, in consequence, with the credit of the State. Nor did they care who suffered, so long as they gained their political point. Nor is that all; for they have never concerned themselves whether the matter was rightly understood by the world or not. This does but show how, in looking to themselves alone for justice, mankind obtain for themselves but very little of it. So negligent have they been of representing the matter fairly to the world, that, not only in other countries, but almost throughout the United States, the prevailing view is this;—that the State of Mississippi, having borrowed money, and not choosing to pay it, has——?—— repudiated!* Among those out of that State, who have made inquiry into the transaction, are some who do not regard the State as bound to pay the money, grounding their judgment on the analogy existing between the responsibility of an individual and that of the State—the former not being answerable for more than has been done by his authority. But they, like the good people of Mississippi, forget that the actual government of a State is the State itself, to all political intents and purposes. The vital head of a State is all that can be externally communicated with. Any absolute power that might be set up in a nation for a brief period, if internally and externally recognized, binds the State by its contracts, though it may not have condescended to notice the constitution which was established antecedently to its despotic rule, even so far as to declare it to have been set aside; for this power is *politically* the State itself, and a violation of the constitution is a matter of domestic responsibility. It is rather surprising that no creditor (that we have heard of) has brought the question into Court. A favourable

* Mississippi has other debts, which she has *not* repudiated.

decision might not improbably have been obtained in the Courts of Mississippi, if brought before new judges were appointed; for, holding office, as they do in that State, for six years, those appointed under the former administration may not have vacated at the period of repudiation. But if otherwise, the Supreme Court of the United States, of which it is the province to expound the duty of sovereign States, if appealed to, protects the right, on whichever side it is. As regards the *prospect* it should be observed, in the first place, that all those Mississippians who approved of the measure for raising the loan, are eager for the settlement of the debt; next, that there are others, who, though repudiators on behalf of the *State*, nevertheless desire to see restitution to the injured parties; and further, that (as the author has been informed) those who are opposed to repudiation, possess the greater portion of the property to be taxed. If so vast a portion of it is in their hands, and if it be within their competency to pay off the debt without troubling the State with it (of which fact the present writer has been assured by intelligent travellers) there is ground for hope that measures are in early prospect for the disencumbrance of that State directly, and of the whole Union indirectly, from the discredit which has been its portion in consequence of the untoward proceeding. But, if the proper parties should not take the requisite measures, would not every person in the union who is able to part with a quarter dollar, make that contribution towards the preservation of national character, and for the reimbursement of those foreigners who have been thus spoiled of their all, in return for their confidence in a majority of gentlemen in one of our State legislatures? Such a course could be no cause of offence to the State of Mississippi, inasmuch as she has professedly nothing to do with the business. It is to be hoped that no foreigner will be allowed to steal a march on us, by bequeathing property enough to settle the repudiated amount; (for it is not long since a considerable sum was bequeathed to this country "for the diffusion of knowledge among men.") If, in that case, the pride of the nation would be wounded, there is, alas! more just cause for it to be so, while the debt is unpaid. Should this mode of settlement be in the womb of destiny—and almost all parties *out* of the State agree that there is *some* destined mode—how bitter is the cup of mortification in store for those in Mississippi, who borrowed the money, have always desired that it should be paid, are able to pay it themselves, but have not yet done it! If indeed their only motive for not raising the required fund among themselves, is, (as it has been suggested) an anxiety that their *State* should


redeem itself, then why do they not purchase the investment from those who now hold it, and take their own chance of its being one day paid by their State?

Before dropping this subject, we submit the following passage from Hunt's Merchant's Magazine, vol. viii., 1843, Article on the National Debts of Europe, by Francis Wharton, an eminent lawyer in Pennsylvania:

"That the funding policy, both of the whig administration of Sir Robert Walpole and of the tory administration of Mr. Pitt, was dangerous in the extreme, in its consequential influence, will be readily admitted. We believe that no more satisfactory precedent can be found for the repudiation of our own days, than the reduction by the English government, between 1716 and 1727, of the interest accruing on the funded debt, from *six to three and a half* per cent. We scarcely know a more striking instance of national ill-faith, than the appropriation by Mr. Pitt and Lord Henry Petty, of the sinking fund pledged to public creditors, to the purposes of temporary revenue. Such precedents require the intervention of a strong over-ruling hand to prevent their repetition; and we trust, for the honor of the Anglo-Saxon race, both in the country from whence its origin is dated, and in the country in which its later energies have taken root, that the principle on which they are based, will be crushed signally and forever."

27

27





LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 010 456 702 2